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INTRODUCTION 
The relation of attitudes and learning has been given considerable 
attention in recent years because of rapid changes in our social and 
technological environment which demand changes in social attitudes. 
The assumptions of "naive realism"--that "what 'tve see is really 
'out there'" and that mere information, "enlightenment," or "truth" is 
sufficient to change attitudes--have been thrown into disrepute by 
experiments in psychology and social psychology in recent years • 
A pioneer in this field was F. C. Bartlett, whose experiments on 
learning and memory demonstrated that the perception of any stimulus is 
colored by one's past experience, his expectations, his attitude, and the 
"effort after meaning."! 
At about the same time as Bartlett was conducting his experiments, 
experimental psychologists attempting to apply Freudian theory to the 
processes of perception, learning, and memory were beginning to find 
evidence of emotional factors as determining forces in these processes.2 
The first experiments were concerned with the forgetting or "repression" 
of unpleasant material, but with further experimentation it was realized 
that "repression" is not the only defense mechanism by which unpleasant 
lF. c. Bartlett, Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1932). 
2navid Rapaport, Emotions and Memory (Second Unaltered Edition; 
New York: International Universities Press, 1950). 
or conflictful st~uli are prevented from affecting people. 
A notable example in the later refinement of the studies of 
attitude and learning is the study in which soldiers viewing an Army 
orientation film learned the specific facts presented but did not bring 
their attitudes into accord with the learned facts.l The experimenters 
2 
suggested that the attitudes may have been based on factors bearing little 
relation to factual knowledge or rational consideration. Factual infor-
mation may have failed to change attitudes simply because the attitudes 
may not have had their origins in information. 
But even when the communicator's approach is relevant to the genesis 
of the attitude, selective exposure and selective perception can interfere 
with its reception. In a study of voting behavior, it was found that 
people tend to expose themselves selectively to the events, issues, and 
arguments of the party to which they are 11predisposed" in a political 
campaign. 2 
The selective exposure evidenced in the study of voting behavior, 
where one exposes himself selectively to one of several alternatives, has 
a counterpart in selective perception when the subject is actually exposed 
to more than one choice among alternatives. Watson and Hartman found, 
among theistic and atheistic students, a tendency to remember material in 
opposition to their positions less well than material in favor of their 
1c. I. Hovland, A. A. Lumsdaine, and F. D. Sheffield, Experiments on 
Mass Communication (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). 
2p, F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People•s 
Choice. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948). 
= 
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positions on theological questions. 1 
When the subject is highly ego-involved in the material, the 
operation of selective perception is even more pronounced. Wallen found 
a significant relation between degree of ego-involvement and retention of 
scores on a personality rating sheet. 2 Ratings of the Subjects which dis-
agreed with the Subjects' ratings of themselves were remembered less well 
than the ratings congruent with their self-images. 
Wallen's findings raised the question as to the advisability of 
using an indirect approach when treating ego-involved attitudes. Hovland 
and Mandell (1952) conducted an experiment with implicit and explicit 
statements of conclusions as the independent variable. 3 In this case it 
was found that the direct approach was more effective in changing attitudes. 
However, the material was not highly ego-involving. The authors suggested 
that the implicit or indirect approach might be more effective when dealing 
with more personal topics. 
The question of the effectiveness of the indirect approach under 
conditions of hi-gher ego-involvement, then, is still unanswered. Recall-
ing the work of Hovland, Lumsdairie, and Sheffield4 J. T. Klapper has 
1w. S. Watson and G. w. Hartman, "The Rigidity of a Basic Attitudi-
nal Frame~" .Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXIV (July, 1939), 
pp. 314-335. 
2Richard Wallen, "Ego-involvement as a Determinant of Selective 
Forgetting, 11 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXVII (January, 
1942), pp. 20-39. 
3c. I. Hovland and Wallace Mandell, "An Experimental Comparison of 
Conclusion-drawing by the Connnunicator and by the Audience," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII (July, 1952), pp. 581-588. 
4 Supra, p. 2. 
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suggested that the indirect approach may be more effective in communicating 
facts without necessarily changing attitudes, and he offers an explanation 
for the phenomenon noted in the Army film studies: 
It may well be that the facts and opinions ~n a communicapio~ 
are not related to the desired attitude charige sufficiently 
strongly to call the protective mediating forces into play; the 
communication is probably not recggnized as necessarily relevayt 
to the attitude, as not salient, and mediation does not occur. 
In other words, one may learn the content and may even accept 
specific opinions presented in a communication if their relation to an 
unacceptable proposal is not perceived. The attitude in opposition thereto 
would remain unaffected. 
The formal hypothesis of the experiment described in this thesis is 
derived from the statement of Klapper quoted·above: 
Subjects indicating strong opposition to the conclusion 
will learn less well the facts presented in a communication when 
the conclusion is stated explicit~y than when the conclusion 
remains unstated and implicit. ' 
Klapper outlines an experiment which could be designed to test this 
hypothesis: 
' A rather simple controlled experiment might be set up, for 
example, in which two groups were exposed to communications, one 
of which explicitly pointed out the implications for attitude 
change of accepting the objective facts. In line with the 
interpretation presented above2 we would hypothesize that in the 
latter communication the objective facts themselves would be more 
likely to be rejected. Such an experiment would differ from the 
numerous studies of "implicit" vs. "explicitn conclusions, which 
1J. T. Klapper, '~hat We Know about the Effects of Mass Communica-
tions--The Brink of Hope, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (Winter, 1957), 
p. 463 and footnote. 
2Ibid., p. 463. 
have to date been primarily concerned with whether the conclusions 
rather than the facts themselves were more or less likely to be 
accepted) 
The experiment outlined by Klapper and the hypothesis on which it 
is founded provide the model for the experiment to be conducted herein. 
Klapper has stated that under the conditions of the above experiment, 
"acceptancen would.be equivalent to 11 learning. 112 In short, Klapper pre-
diets that when the conclusions of a counternorm communication are 
' 
explicitly stated, the whole content of the communication will be less 
well learned than when they are left implicit. 
This experiment differs from others involving selective perception 
in that it is concerned with the operatruon of selective perception under 
control of the variable, nimplicitness-explicitness or statement of 
conclusions." 
It differs from other "implicit-explicitn experiments, as Klapper 
points out, in its concern with learning of the factual content of the 
message rather than with actual change of attitude. 
It should be emphasized that the present experiment does not ask 
if a certain procedure will succeed in changing attitudes. It seeks, 
rather, to un.derstand the way in which information related to an attitude 
may be accepted without necessarily having an observaole effect on the 
attitude. Because of the subtlety of the indirect approach, and 
considering the resistance which the direct approach is likely to 
1 Ibid., p. 463. 
2Interview with J. T. K~apper, September 19, 1958. 
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stimulate, attitude change is not expected to occur. Verification of the 
hypothesis would be a greater contribution to understanding of the way in 
which attitudes are maintained than 0f.the way in which they might be 
changed. 
Design of the Experiment 
The experiment was conducted as follows: An affectively charged 
topic was selected. This satisfied the requirement that Subjects be highly 
.,;., 
ego-involved and defensive. Moreover, it was felt that an affectively 
toned issue would give more statistically significant results. 
An attitude test was administered to ascertain which subjects 
exhibited the most extreme attitudes. 
Two communications were designed. They were identical in all 
respects except in the implicitness or explicitness of their statements of 
conclusions. These communications were read by two independent and 
separate groups of subjects. 
The subjects were college students, who constitute a "captive 
audience" when approached in the context of a classroom situation. It 
was felt that this was necessary in order to assure the presence of the 
same group of subjects during the several stages of the experiment. 
Following the reading of the communication, both groups £ook an 
identical quiz. The quiz was concerned only with the specific facts 
presented in the message and was designed to reveal differential learning 
if any was present_ •. One week later, a retention quiz, identical to the 
,_£.ir.st··q_uiz, was given to test for differential forgetting. 
A third group received no communication, but was given the quiz in 
order to establish the general level of information on the content prior 
to reading the communication. 
Implementation 
It was decided to use the topic of "birth control," which is a 
sensitive and ego~involving issue for an identifiable and substantial 
group of people. 
A Thurstone attitude scale was employed. This scale, relating 
directly to attitudes toward birth control, was constructed by Thurstone 
in 1930 and was therefore subject to certain limitations in the way it 
could be employed for this experiment. These limitations are more fully 
discussed in Chapter II. 
For the communication, an article was selected on the problem of 
industrial development as related to population growth in underdeveloped 
countries. The writer edited this article to make two versions, one of 
which explicitly recommended birth control, the other one leaving the 
conclusion unstated. In all other respects, the two versions were 
identical. 
7 
The quiz contained a mixture of true-false and sentence-completion 
items which referred to specific factual statements in the article. There 
were also two open-ended questions designed to ascertain whether the im-
plications for birth control had been recognized by the Subjects. This 
also provided a check on the actual implicitness or explicitness of the 
communication. 
The same quiz was administered one week later to test for retention. 
8 
Analysis 
The fact-quiz scores were tested for significant differences by 
analysis of variance. It was predicted that persons indicating opposition 
on the attitude test and receiving the explicit communication would score 
lower on the fact quiz than would subjects registering opposition and 
receiving the Unplicit communication. 
It was decided to carry the hypothesis one step farther and test 
not only for differential effects of implicit versus explicit statement 
of conclusions, holding 11attitude11 (opposition to the proposal) constant, 
but also to test for the effects of different attitude 'position. The 
differential effect of implicit and explicit treatments, according to 
this second hypothesis, would be absent in the responses of those favoring 
the conclusion. 
Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis follows the standard form for experimental theses. 
Chapter One contains a survey of the literature relating to 
attitudes and learning, cognitive and emotional factors in perception and 
learning, the concept of ego-involvement, and the effectiveness of 
implicit as against explicit statements of conclusions. 
Chapter Two presents in detail the conduct of the experiment and 
the particular problems that arose in connection therewith. 
Chapter Three presents the results in the form of graphs and 
tables as well as text. It includes statistical analysis of the data. 
Chapter Four contains the summary of findings, discussion, and 
conclusions. 
= 
CHAPTER ONE 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE .ON THE RELATION 
BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND LEARNING 
Theory and experimentation on the relation between attitudes and 
learning have progressed not in straight-line fashion, but rather on 
several lines of development. In this discussion, principal attention 
is given to the Gestalt and the Freudian schools and the theories which 
have developed out of them. However, it should be noted in advance that 
much of the experimentation has been based on eclectic theories, utilizing 
the concepts and/or theory of more than one "school." 
Cognitive Organization and Memory 
The foundations of modern theory about attitudes and learning are 
tQ be found in psychoanalytic and Gestalt theory. Gestalt theory, as 
epitomized in the work of F. C. Bartlett, will be surveyed first--not 
because it was historically first, but because experimentation was slow 
in development along the lines of Freudian theory. 
Stimulated by apparent differences between individuals in their 
perceptions of optical illusions, Bartlett conducted a systematic series 
of experiments on perception, "imaging," and memory in which_he found 
that "perceptual process, in fact, involves two different, but related 
functions: 
(a) that of the sensory pattern, which provides a physiological 
basis for perceiving; and 
, 
(b) that of another factor which constructs the sensory pattern 
into something having a significance which goes beyond its 
~ediate sensory character. 1 
Lest the "other factor" seem too vague to be useful, Bartlett adds 
in a footnote that it is equivalent to the concept "effort after meaning" 
which he defines elsewhere as 
• • • the attempt to connect something that is given with 
something other than itself.2 
To illustrate the concept of "effort after meaning," Bartlett 
describes the responses of experimental Subjects who were shown simple 
line drawings, many of them non-representational. Most of the Subjects 
assigned to the figures the name of some object or percept in their past 
experience to which the "nonsense" figure was analogous •. In reproducing 
these figures, the labels assigned to them affected the way they were 
drawn, in that certain features were more similar to the analogue than to 
the original figure. There is evident here an "attempt to connect 
something that is given with something other than itself." 
From this simple, controlled laboratory experiment, Bartlett 
proceeded to investigate the operation of "effort after meaning" in 
increasingly "meaningful" and naturalistic settings, finding confirmation 
of the "effort after meaning11 at every step. 
When asking his Subjects to recall a stimulus field (a drawing of 
of a landsctj.pe, for example), Bartlett found that they had gained a 
10 
1 F. C. Bartlett, Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1932) ' p. 188. 
2Ibid •. , p. 227. 
= 
general ~pression of it and then filled in the details with little 
reference to the actual st~ulus. The details, apparently "inferredn 
from the general ~pression, were usually such as to confirm the ~pres-
sion. Bartlett calls this general ~pression the "attitude.n 
But it is not always clear what he means by "attitude, 11 since at 
times it seems to refer to a "mood" elicited by a stimulus and somehow 
associated with it when remembered: 
In all these instances, the blots seemed first to arouse 
a certain attitude, characterized predominantly ~y feeling, 
which provided a background for specific ~ages. 
At other times he seems to equate it to the temperament of the 
subject: 
They were people who maintained throughout a confident attitude. 
• • • Here we meet with another factor of great functional 
importance for our general theme: the influence of temperament, 
and of "attitude" in perceiving and remembering. 2 
On another occasion, attitude is linked to evaluation of the 
stimulus: 
•. temperament, interests, and attitudes •••• may have 
not a little to do with the emergence of a valuing, criticizing 
tendency; and in this way they may he:lp to direct the ~tream of 
changes which remembered material constantly exhibits. 
But in the final analysis, he sees attitude as a kind of generali-
zation about the st~ulus, having some connection with feeling or affect, 
which determines the way the stimulus is perceived and remembered. Thus, 
1
rbid.' p. 41 
2Ibid,, P• 21. 
3 Ibid., P• 33. 
11 
= 
perception is not merely a mental replication, nor memory a reduplication 
of the stimulus field. Rather, the stimulus field is actively rational-
ized, or in the more common terminology of Gestalt psychology, organized 
by perception and memory. Moreover, this rationalization is done in a 
manner consonant with one's past experience and present needs, interests, 
and values. 
Ask the observer .to characterize this general impression 
psychologically, and the word that is always cropping up is 
"attitude." •.• this "attitude" factor came into nearly 
every series of experiments that was carried out. The 
construction that is effected is the sort of construction 
that would justify the observer's 11attitude. 11 Attitude 
names a complex psychological state or process which is very 
hard to describe in more elementary psychological terms. It 
is, however, ..• very largely a matter of feeling, or 
affect. We say that it is characterized by doubt, hesitation, 
surprise, astonishment, confidence, dislike, repulsion, and 
so on. • • • The recall is then a construction, made largely 
on the basis of this attitude, and its general effect is that 
of a justification of the attitude.l 
Referring to the experiment mentioned earlier, the "attitude" was 
expressed in the label assigned to the nonsense figure in an attempt to 
12 
give it meaning. ''Attitude" in more complex social situations, which often 
differ in ambiguity from the "nonsense" figures only in degree, is merely 
a more complexly organized cognitive function. 
Thus, while it would seem that Bartlett had assigned a determining 
role in cognitive reactions to the play.of naffect," "feeling," or emotion, 
a careful analysis of his use of the words ''affect11 and "feeling" will 
reveal that they are .employed in a rather intellectualized manner. For 
example, in describing the way Subjects .recalled drawings of men's faces, 
1Ibid., pp. 206-207. 
he notes that they often noticed the expression on the face and 
characterized it in an "affective" way, e.g. "grim," "smiling," "good-
humored," "ferocious."l Having assigned these affective general impres-
sions, they fill in the details accordingly. 
In all these cases it looks very much as if, under the 
influence of the affective attitude involved, some of the 
detail given in recall is genuinely begin constructed.2 
The 11 affect, 11 it is noted, is apparently assigned to the percept 
rather than to the subject in the example. Thus, in some cases at least, 
the locus of 11 affect~• is in the perceptual field rather than in the per-
ceiver. The role of affect in motivating the way the field is perceived 
13 
is, according to Bartlett, secondary to its role as a cognitive organizer 
in the "effort after meaning." 
His position is reiterated by Asch, a "Gestaltist11 : 
• • • thinkers have often hastily identified beliefs with the 
emotional sources that lend them strength. It is, however, 
confusing to make an outright identification between beliefs 
and emotional processes. A b~lief once established is a 
condition of further action, which exerts specific effects 
regardless of other sources of support it may receive. 3 
This extended discussion of the meaning of 11affect11 in Bartlett's 
work has been undertaken because of the opposition to this conception of 
its meaning to be found in the psychoanalytic approach to the relation of 
affect and cognitive processes. 
1Ibid., p. 53. 
2Ibid., p. 55. 
3s .. :E. ,Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952), 
p. 564. 
14 
However, the fmportance of this difference between the approaches 
should not be allowed .to overshadow Bartlett's valuable contribution to the 
understanding of the roles both of subjective factors in perception and of 
organization and meaning as determinants of the operation of cognitive 
processes. 
Emotions and Memory 
We have seen that Bartlett's concept of attitude as a determinant of 
perception was rather more cognitive than affective. "Affect" comes into 
play only when 
• • • reaction threatens to be determined in many ways at 
once, and a consequent risk of harmful indecision arises. 1 
It is the need to avoid indecision, rather than an emotional 
conflict, which precipitates the appeal to "image. 11 
Gordon Allport has summarized the approach of the Gestaltists, 
culminating in Bartlett~s work, as follows: 
Many authors have reduced the phenomena of perception, 
judgment, memory, learning, and thought largely to the operation 
of attitudes •••• To borrow a phrase from William James, they 
'engender meaning upon the world'; ••• they are our methods 
for finding our way about in an ambiguous universe. It is 
especially when the stimulus is not of great intensity nor 
closely bound with some reflex or automatic response that 
attitudes pla! a decisive role in the determination of meaning 
and behavior. 
The discovery that nmeaningfulness 11 and "organization" were 
1Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 302-303. 
2Gordon Allport, "The Historical Background of Modern Social 
Psychology," Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Gardner Lindzey {Cambridge: 
Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 44. 
important factors in memory has been called the "first revolution11 ·in 
memory theory.l 
15 
The second revolution, according to Rapaport, is in the recognition 
that 
the memory laws based on logical 'meaning' and 'organization' of 
the memory material refer only to the special cases of memory 
organization; the more general theory of memory is the theory 
based on 'emotional organization' of memories--in other words, 
on the organization of memories by strivings. 2 
Rapapo·rt goes on to say that Bartlett had recognized this in his 
theory that "reproduction is the justification of an attitude."3 However, 
Rapaport is not to be taken too seriously at this point, since what he 
means by attitude is not the same as what Bartlett means, as shall be 
demonstrated. 
A word about Rapaport's book, "Emotions and Memory," is in order. 
It is a survey of much of the theory and experimentation concerning the 
relation between emotion and memory based on Freudian concepts. It is 
frankly opposed to the cognitive approach of the Gestaltists, and postu-
lates. that perception, learning, and memory are dominated by the conflict 
between the instinctual forces of the id and the adjustive strivings of the 
ego. Emotions, as products of this conflict, are the motivating forces 
behind all human activity. 
lnavid Rapaport, Emotions and Memory (Second Unaltered Edition; 
New York: . International Universities Press, 1950), p. 267. 
2Ibid. 
3Bartlett, pp. cit., p. 207. 
= 
. • • The motivation of human behavior having become a focal 
problem in psychological investigation, the question arises 
whether memory is a photographic or a motivated process •••• 
It is implied that memory is a motivated yehavior phenomenon 
and that emotions are motivating factors. 
Let us compare Bartlett's conception of the role of "affective 
attitudes" with Freud's concept of the role of "emotions." 
How different is the Freudian concept of memory as motivated by 
emotions from "effort after meaning" manifested in "affective attitudes!" 
. l 
16 
Memory--and the perception in which it is grounded--is, in Freudian theory, 
motivated by the warfare between ego and id; in Bartlett, it is motivated 
by the need to avoid indecision when faced with "cross-streams of 
interest."2 
Allport indicates the magnitude of the difference in this passage: 
• • • It was the influence of Freud that endowed attitudes 
with vitality, equating them with longing, hatred and love, with 
passion and prejudice, in short, with the onrushing stream of 
unconscious life. • • • For the explanation of prejudice, loyalty, 
patriotism, crow·d behavior, control b~ propaganda, no anemic 
conception of attitudes will suffice. 
Unfortunately, experimentation with Freudian concepts, although 
its beginnings were contemporaneous with the Gestalt experiments, was 
naively executed. This is due in part to the basically clinical nature 
of both psychoanalytic practice and the clinical origin of the theory out 
of which it arose. There was virtually no precedent for experimentation. 
This was complicated by the fact that Freud had written so much, and few 
1Rapaport, op. cit., p. 8. 
2Bartlett, op. cit., P· 303. 
3Allport, op. cit., P· 44. 
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expermenters were thoroughly familiar with the theory of psychoanalysis. 
They tended to mpose interpretations appropriate to their own,frames 
of reference and subsequently were criticized by others. for misinterpreting 
Freud. 
A few examples will demonstrate the various ways in which Freudian 
theories of the relation of memory to emotion were tested. 
Experments on "Hedonic Tone" and Memory 
The earliest experments were smply tests of memory of "pleasant 
and unpleasantn materials. The term nhedonic tone" is also used to refer 
to the pleasantness or'unpleasantness of these materials. The assumption 
was that pleasant words or material would be better remembered than 
unpleasant material. Tait (1913) presented a list of "pleasant" and 
"unpleas·ant" and indifferent words and some colored stimuli to nine 
Subjects. When asked to reproduce the list of words and to recognize 
the colors, the Subjects recalled 6% more of the pleasant material than 
of the unpleasant material. Indifferent material was least remembered. 
He concluded that "pleasant words are better remembered.nl 
On the other hand, Wohlgemuth (1923), using 687 school children, 
ages 6-11, tested the recall of remembered personal experiences and found 
evidence to the contrary: his subjects recalled a greater proportion of 
1w. D. Tait, "Effect of Psychophysical Attitudes on Memory," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, VIII (April-May, 1913), 
pp. 10-38. Cited in H. Meltzer, "The Present Status of Expermental 
Studies on the Relation of Feeling to Memory,n Psychological Review, 
XXXVII (March, 1930), pp. 124-139. 
= 
the unpleasant experiences than of the pleasant ones. 1 
Meltzer, in reviewing these and other studies on feeling and 
memory, indicates several defects which are relevant to the present 
investigation, including the inadvisability of using children, who seem 
to be far less subject to the repression of unpleasant experiences, and 
the questionable nature of the assumption that people have an equal 
number of pleasant and unpleasant experiences each day. But Meltzer's 
principal objection is one not unlike that which prompted Bartlett to 
discard the methods of Ebbinghaus and investigate more natural and 
meaningful situations. 
Instead of analyzing the total emotional situation 
including the social setting, the investigators, by and large, 
have studied their individuals in artificial laboratory situa-
tions. And it is this fact, more perhaps than any other, that 
explains the lack of progress made in the investigation of the 
problem. 2 
Improvement in experimental design was not long in coming. 
Menzies (1935) asked 50 college students to recall the expe~iences of the 
previous· day. At intervals of· one and three weeks, he asked them to 
recall again the events of that day. He found that recall was correlated 
with the affective intensity of the experiences rather than the direction 
in terms of pleasantness or unple~santness.3 
18 
lA. A. Wohlgemuth, A Critical Examination of Psychoanalysis 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1923), pp. 28-39, 209-217. Cited by H. Meltzer, 
op. cit. 
2 H. Meltzer, op. cit., p. 133. 
3Rod Menzies, "The Comparative Memory Values of Pleasant, Unpleas-
ant, and Indifferent Materials," Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
XVIII (April, 1935), pp. 267·279. 
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He concluded from this that· 
The results of this investigation are opposed to Thorndike's 
law of effect,l Troland's reflex principle, and similar learning 
mechanisms. There is no evidence here of repression of unpleasant 
memories such as the psycho-analysts claim to operate. It is of 
course possible, putting it in psycho-analytic terms, that the 
censor operated to prevent complexes subject to repression from 
appearing in these memories. 2 
Gilbert (1937) derived findings contradictory to Menzies'. Hypothe-
sizing that "there is a development of hedonistic selectivity in memory 
from childhood to auulthood," he construceed lists of pleasant and unpleas-
and words and presented them to two groups--one of children and one of 
adults. In comparing the two groups for recall of the words, he found 
that children tend to remember more unpleasant than pleasant words, but 
that, in addition, they remembered viuid words more than neutral ones. 
On the other hand, adults, remembering more pleasant words, tended to 
indicate no correlation with vividness. In addition, vividness and recall 
were more highly correlated for both groups in the earlier recall than in 
the later. 
This seems to indicate that the laws of vividness and affect are 
jointly operative and mutually complementary in the memory of 
effective [~ material. 
The higher vividness correlation for ~ediate recall than 
for delayed recall justifies our claim 3that ~ediate recall is not 
a fair test for the hedonistic factor. 
1Thorndike 1 s 1'law of effect" states that behavior leading to a 
"satisfying state" will persist, while behavior leading to an "annoying 
state" ·will cease. 
2Menzies, op. cit., p. 277. 
3G. M. Gilbert, "The Age Difference in the Hedonistic Tendency in 
Memory," Journal of Experimental Psychology, XXI (October, 1937), p. 439. 
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Gilbert concluded that hedonistic selectivity does develop as one 
moves toward adulthood. 
Sharp (1938), using psychiatric and normal patients as Subjects; used 
phrases rather than words in testing the relation of hedonic tone to memory 
revival. 1 She felt that phrases combining nouns and adjectives related 
to the case histories of the patients would be a test of the theory. 
So far as these material~ are concerned, the experimental 
results establish the truth of Freudts assumption,of the existence 
of the phenomena of repression and enhancement. They also co~firm 
his assumption of the universal character of these phenomena. 
In 1938, Gilbert surveyed the experiments on emotions and memory 
which had been conducted since Meltzer's survey in 1930. He found that 
many of the errors pointed out by Meltzer had been corrected in experiments 
performed since the earlier survey, and summarized the general findings. 
First, hedonic selection (pleasant material remembered better than unpleas-
ant),appears to be greater after some delay than in testing Umnediately 
after exposure. Second, vividness, rather than pleasantness, determines 
recall when tested Unmediately after exposure. Third, hedonic selection 
is almost or entirely absent in children. Finally, memory of the pleasant-
ness or unpleasantness tends to approach "indifference," and may even 
reverse with time. This appears to occur more frequently with unpleasant 
1A. A. Sharp, "An Experimental Test of Freud's Doctrine of the 
Relation of Hedonic Tone to Memory Revival," Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, XXII (May, 1938), pp. 395-418. 
2Ibid., p. 418. Sharp found that both pleasant and unpleasant 
material were "repressed," but that, after the first recall, the pleasant 
material was "enhanced." The precise meaning of "enhancement" is not 
clear, but it seems to be related to the "sleeper" effect, which will be 
discussed below. 
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than with pleasant memories. 1 
However, in 1941, Edwards challenged the validity of the claUn of 
most of the foregoing experiments to have been testing Freudian theory. 
Citing the contradictory findings of the experiments on memory of pleasant 
and unpleasant materials, he suggests that many of them were based on 
misunderstandings of Freud. 
An experience is excluded from consciousness not because 
it is unpleasant, but rather because it involves conflict.2 
Conflict, then, .according to Edwards, is an essential feature of any 
situation in which "repression" occurs. Edwards interprets "conflict" in 
terms of "frame of reference" theory, 3 and sets up the hypothesis that 
• • • experiences which are in harmony with an existing frame of 
reference will tend to be lear~ed and remembered better than those 
which are in conflict with it. 
Edwards' hypothesis was substantiated in his experiment, wherein 
Subjects known to be pro-New Deal and anti-New Deal were exposed to a 
communication containing a balance of arguments for and against the New 
DeaL The pro-New Deal Subjects perceived the message as "pro" and 
displayed significantly better recognition of "pro" arguments. The 
1G. M. GiiLbert, "The Ne~ Status of Experimental Stu.dies on the 
Relationship of Feeling to Memory," Psychological Bulletin, XXXV (January, 
1938), pp. 26~35. 
2 A. L. Edwards, 11Political Frames of Reference as a Factor Influ-
encing Recognition," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXVI 
(January, 1941), p. 34. 
3Edwards defines "frame of reference" as a "concept which is used 
to designate the organization of desires, attitudes, wishes, values, etc. 
within an individual as a result of learning." Ibid., p. 48. 
4 Ibid., p. 35. 
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anti-New Deal Subjects perceived the conununication as "anti" and displayed 
significantly better recognition of "antiu arguments. Moreover, there was 
~ 
significant forgetting of 9oth congruent and conflict material, but there 
was a consistent, although unreliable, tendency for the amount forgotten 
to be related to the degree of conflict between the material and the frame 
of reference. 
It is likely, then, that cnnflict is a necessary ingredient of any 
situation in which "repression" is displayed. Edwards' experimental 
design and findings can be said to be an "advance" over the earlier 
experiments not only in giving recognition to the importance of "conflict" 
as a variable, but also in the importance assigned to the "frame of 
reference." It might be said that Edwards' experiment epitomizes the 
drawing together of the Freudian concern with "emotion" and the Gestalt 
concern with "organization ... The prior experiments had not given serious 
attention to the "organizing" func.tion of the perceptual processes by which 
supposedly .. pleasant" and "unpleasant" material was received; nor had the 
Gestaltists~-as exemplified in Bartlett--given due recognition to the 
motivating force of an emotional conflict. Even at this writing, there are 
some who maintain that the "weddingrr has not yet taken place: 
Important as these conceptions are as a point of departure 
for formulating the relationship between cognition and conation, 
Gestaltists have not formulated a systematic theory of personality, 
ego function, and motivation. Nor have they delved into the 
processes which mediate between motivation and representation. 
Aside from an incomplete definition of attitude, they have not 
really shown ho"t-1 attitudes influenle the "autochthonous" 
Gestalten in the phenomenal field. 
1Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory," Handbook of Social 
"Psychology. ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p. 113. 
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But at least there has been an "engagement," and it would appear that 
even if the Gestaltists1 "bride" has.developed cold feet, the Freudian 
"groom" awaits only her decision, Rapaport, whose approach, it will be 
remembered, is avowedly psychoanalytic, seems to acknowledge the relevance 
of "organizational factors," with which theGestaltists are so concerned. 
He finds from his survey that, in addition to the hierarchical range of 
degrees of influence which emotional factors might exert, they also vary 
in their organization in personality • 
• • • 'emotional factors• may not only quantitavely facilitate 
or inhibit remembering, or result in forgetting. They were found 
to organize the emerging memories, condensing, distorting, and 
symbolically replacing them.l · 
Summary of Conclusions from Findings of Experiments on Emotions 
and Memory 
Much of the experimentation claiming to be based on psychoanalytic 
theory wa$, in fact, not so based. The principle error, according to 
Rapaport, was that Freud had been thought to say that unpleasant material 
would be forgotten. 
Thus, the real theory--'the avoidance of arousal of pain through 
memory'·-a formulation which allows for manifold mechanisms of 
executing the 'avoidance'--was usually missed. 2 
Still, there was enough consistency in the findings, when the 
~ariance of the experiments from Freudian theory was taken into account, 
to make the following generalization: 
The material obtained revealed a 'lawfulness' which may be stated 
1Rapaport, op. cit., p. 270. 
2Ibid. , p. 269. 
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as follows: (a) 'emotional factors' whose presence was indicated 
by the subject, either when rating the material in question or when 
reporting in retrospect the experiences of the course of the memory 
experiment, had some influence on memory; (b) this influence de-
pends both on the intensity and quality of the 'emotional factor'; 
(c) the more intellectualized and conventionalized the nature of 
the 'emotional factor', and the more purely quantitative the method 
of experimentation employed, the more the intensity of the 'emo-
tional factor' was correlated with the influence exerted on memory; 
the more qualitative the methods and the more genuine the emotional 
experiences employed, the more obvious was 1the influence of the 
'quality' of the 'emotional factor';, .•• 
Experiments on Attitude Change through Communication 
The foregoing has been principally concerned with studies of 
attitudes and emotions as related to memory and related mental processes. 
The concepts of "attitude" a:nd "emotion" have been purposely left 
undefined because in thesE early stages of the development of theory, 
they were not clearly conceptualized. Attitude has been variously 
described as 
• • • a2neuropsychic state of readiness for mental and physical activity 
• • • an orientation of the agent toward the image and its less 
articulated 'schematic' surroundings3 
••• the sum total of a man's inclinations or feelings, prejudice 
or bias, preconceived not!ons, ideas, fears, threats, and conviction~ 
about any specific topic. 
These are just a few of the more prominent definitions. They are 
1rbid. 
2Allport, op. cit., p. 43. 
3 Bartlett, op. cit., p. 303. 
4L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, The Measurement of Attitude 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 6-7. 
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definitions derived from the various ways in which the concept has been 
used to explain behavior. Whatever definition one espouses, it must be 
remembered that attitudes are inferred from behavior. Furthermore, 
although the concept has undergone considerable refinement, one must be 
careful to avoid reification of '.'attitude." It is better thought of as a 
process than as a ''thing." Some of the experiments to be discussed here 
indicate the "enduring" characteristic of an attitude, and would tempt one 
to think of it as a fixed entity. Indeed, the earlier discussion of 
Gestalt psychology and of Freudian theory would tend to give the impression 
of nfixity" in the ways one perceives and remembers. ~.Jhile it is true 
that the normal mental processes tend to be conservative, a few of the 
experiments to follow suggest that conservatism is functional rather than 
inherent. Changes in attitudes, in emotional reactions, and perceptual 
"habits" have been shown to take place. Our purpose here is not so much 
to demonstrate fixity and change as to contnibute to an explanation of it. 
Sherif (1935), in his study of the responses to the autokinetic 
phenomenon1 found that his Subjects' estimates of the movements of the 
lights were decidedly influenced by suggestions from other subjects in 
the experimental situation. 2 
1A stationary pinpoint of light in a totally dark room is normally 
perceived as being in motion. This is the autokinetic phenomenon. The 
amount of apparent motion perceived varies widely from person to person. 
2Muzafer Sherif, "A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception," 
Archives of Psychology, #187, 1935. Cited inS. E. Asc~, Social Psychol~ 
ogy (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952), pp. 485-492. 
This was taken as an indication that one's perceptions can be 
changed under the influence of a social situation in which different 'ways 
of looking at things' are presented. But-the stimulus in this case was 
"pure" and also ambiguous. As an experiment to test "frame of reference" 
theory, this was at about the same stage as Bartlett's early attempts to 
understand the operations of perceptual processes and memory when he 
employed the 11nonsense11 methods of Ebbinghaus. Or it might be likened to 
the early stages o~ experimentation with Freudian theory utilizing single 
stimulus words to test for the operation of hedonic selectivity. 
Thus the operation of social factors in Sheri£.' s laboratory 
demonstrated only a special case of the changeability of attitudes. It 
was not long before others experimented with more realistic social 
situations and more meaningful attitudes. 
Edwards, cited earlier, demonstrated the tendency of one's frame 
of reference to color his perception of a communication. 1 
Watson and Hartman (1939) presented pairs of arguments for and 
against belief in God to two groups of subjects--one known to be theistic 
and the other known to be atheistic. 2 On the.basis of Sherif's findings 
and "frame of reference" theory, it was expected that, after reading the 
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material and discussing it between themselves, the two groups would reveal, 
via their responses to an attitude scale, a closer approximation to each 
1supra, p. 21. 
~<1. S. Watson and G. W. Hartman, "The Rigidity of a Basic Attitudi-
nal Frame," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXIV (January,. 
1941), pp. 314-335. 
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other's point of view. The expectation,was not fulfilled. While most of 
the differences between the groups in their learning of the arguments pre-
sented were too small to be considered significant, the trend was consist-
ently in the direction of better recollection of arguments with which they 
agreed. This corroborated the findings of Edwards, mentioned above. The 
authors conclude: 
At the end of a two-hour period of earnest response to 
alternatives, there had been no perceptible approximation of the 
frame of the opposed groups. Does this fact mean that we are 
pennanently doomed to "temperamental incompatibility" and 
"ideological pluralism"? Or are the dynamici of fundamental 
transformation so subtle that they elude us? 
Levine and Murphy, in a study of the differences in learning and 
forgetting of controversial statements, found that learning was less nearly 
complete and forgetting more nearly complete among those Subjects who were 
opposed to a message. 2 The differences in remembering and forgetting 
between groups in agreement with the message and those opposed to the 
message tended to grow wider with time. 
The experiments of Watson and Hartman, and of Levine and Murphy are 
1Ibid., pp. 330-331. 
2J. M. Levine and Gardner Murphy, 11The Learning and Forgetting of 
Controversial Material," Journal of Abnonnal and Social Psychology, XXXVIII 
(October, 1943), pp. 507-517. 
In this article, Levine and Murphy list some of the other variables 
which would affect the learn.ing and forgetting of the material. This will 
have some bearing on later discussion. They include the following: 
the particular attitude being studied; the number and kind of sub-
jects; their motivation; the difficulty of the material; its affect-
ive tone; the degree of conflict between the material and the 
attitude; the external testing situation, which includes the 
relations of the experimenter and the subjects; changes in the 
broader field from which the attitude stems. (p. 514.) 
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of interest because they demonstrate in more meaningful situations the 
operation of selective processes which contribute to the difficulty of 
changing attitudes or frames of reference. They did not, however, investi-
gate the manner in which the material was transfo~ed in the process of 
perception. Was the material actually forgotten outright, or was the 
apparent "forgetting" actually due to other defense mechanismsf 
Cooper and Jahoda, interested in discovering more precisely the 
manner in which people defend their attitudes from exte~nal pressures to 
change, studied the reactions of prejudiced and unprejudiced Subjects to 
a number of cartoons. 1 These cartoons had been designed to ridicule 
prejudice and bigotry, but the prejudiced Subjects, through what appears 
to be an unconscious process, fail to respond to the intended message. 
Cooper and Jahoda list three general means of avoidance: 
1) Misunderstanding the message: the subject initially 
has some understanding of the meaning but talks around it until 
his perception of the cartoon is irrelevant to its purpose. 
2) Message rendered invalid: having recognized fully the 
meaning and intent of the cartoon, the Subject denies that it 
applies to himself or else maintains that the situation depicted 
is a "special case." 
3) Alters the Frame of Reference: The Subject never 
1Eunice Cooper and Marie Jahoda, "The Evasion of Propaganda: How 
Prejudiced People Respond to Anti:-prejudice Propaganda," Journal of 
Psychology, XXIII (January, 1947), pp. 15-25. Reprinted in Daniel Katz, 
Darwin Cartwright, et al., Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: 
The Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 313-319. 
perceives the true intent of the message, but views the cartoon as 
depicting a situation within his own frame of reference. The meaning may 
be reversed.l 
The authors then outline their theory of evasion of propaganda as 
a cultural pattern. Two of the reasons for evasion which they list are 
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of special interest: 1) Fear of isolation and the threat to the Ego: an 
attempt to change one's attitudes may be regarded as disapproval of one's 
personal identity or "self." The target of the propaganda may also feel, 
with some justification, that if he changes his attitudes--which are 
largely conditioned by the groups of which he is a member--he may lose his 
position in the group. 2) The multiplicity of value systems: in a com-
plex society where one plays several roles, there may be areas in which 
the roles conflict. In order to minimize the tension which might arise, 
one is forced to compartmentalize each role. The barriers to communication 
between these roles are themselves means of internal evasion, and render 
more difficult the resolution of inconsistencies. 2 
~bid., pp. 16·21 in Journal of Psychology; pp. 314-317 in Katz, 
Cartwright, et al. 
, Smith, Bruner, and \Vhite have listed eight principal nstrategies" 
of dealing with challenging items of information.n They include: 1) de-
nial, 2) skepticism about the source, 3) ascription of motive to source, 
4) "isolation"--(accepting item but keeping it from attitude context), 
5) minimization of importance or relevance of item, 6) interpretation--
(changing context of fact and thus making the meaning more acceptable), 
7) misunderstanding, 8) thinking away; "moving from a correct original 
perception of the. item to quite other conclusions, via a loose chain of 
thought." (cf. M. B. Smith, J. S. Bruner, and R. W. White, Opinions and 
Personality (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 251. 
2cooper and Jahoda, op. cit., pp. 21-23 in Journal of Psychology; 
pp. 317-318 in Katz, Cartwright, et. al. 
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It has been shown that attitudes tend to interfere with perception 
and with learning and memory. However, interference with learning is not 
the only way in which attitudes are maintained. There is evidence that 
information whose implications are contrary to a given attitude can be 
learned without the attitude being changed. 
An e:s;ample frequently cited is the film "The Battle of Britain," 
which was produced during World War II as a part of the orientation pro-
gram of the War Department.! The objectives of the program, and of the 
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film, were to create attitudes favorable to American participation in the 
war and thus to increase motivation to contribute to the war effort. It 
was assumed that if the facts in the film were learned, attitudes toward 
the British people and toward American participation in the war would 
become more favorable. 
In an experiment conducted to measure the anticipated increment in 
information learned and in favorableness of attitude toward the war 
effort, it was found that there was a significant amount of factual 
learning as a result of the film, and certain opinions specifically 
covered in the film were changed. However, there was little or no change 
in general attitudes toward the British or toward the war effort. 
Attempting to explain the failure of the film to accomplish its 
primary goals, the authors list five possible contributing factors: 2 
1) Previous indoctrination as civilians may already have 
1c. I. Hovland, A. A. Lumsdaine, and F. D. Sheffield, Experiments 
on MasscCOmmunication (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), see 
esp. pp. 21·79, 182-200. 
2Ibid., pp. 65-72. 
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accomplished maximum att.itude change and motivation to serve, 
2) There may have been other motivations conflicting with 
the purposes of the program, e.g. fear of injury, pressure from 
the family, etc; 
3) A single 50~minute presentation is not likely to have 
much effect on well-structured attitudes; 
4) The content of the film did not treat desired opinion 
changes specifically. 
The whole question of "specific coverage" raises the 
interesting research problem of whether or not effects are generally 
possible in a communication that carries an implied rather than a 
stated "message." To expect that the orientation film would cause 
changes in certain of the criterion questions involves the assump-
tion that opinions will change as a result of the implications of 
factual material even though the1inference is not explicitly drawn and stated in the communication. 
5) It may be that the effects of the film do not manifest 
themselves ~ediately, but require some time to become assimilated 
into the structure of one's t~inking and activity. (This point is 
of particular relevance to the experimental hypothesis of the 
present thesis.) 
Perhaps~ for example, the influence of factual information is not 
in the ~ediate changes in opinion produced but in its effect--
as a store of knowl~dge--in affecting the interpretations of sub-
sequently learned facts •. or·perhaps the implications of facts are 
not seen immediately but instead require a period to think them 
over or see their relevance in subsequent discussions. The main 
point being made is that films may have delayed or "sleeper" 2 effects that require a lapse of time to become evident, .••• 
1 Ibid., p. 70. 
2Ibid., p. 71. Cf. discuss·ion of Sharp, supra, p. 20. 
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In a subsequent chapter, the authors discuss evidence of the 
"sleeper" effect mentioned above. Certain opinion items on the delayed 
after-test of the effects of the film "The Battle of Britain" showed an 
increased change in the direction advocated by the film, rather than the 
expected return in the direction of previously held attitudes. There is 
some indication that this reversal is more apparent than real: that in 
fact the Subject was predisposed to change in the direction of the film. 
But the authors suggest that predisposition alone could not account for 
the "sleeper" effect and suggest that it might be due to Hforgetting of an 
initially discounted source,u udelayed interpretation in a relevant 
context,"1 or "conversion of details into attitudes. 112 
Hovland and \veiss (1951) tested the first hypothesis--that the_ 
sleeper effect was due to the forgetting of an initially discounted 
source. 3 The experiment produced a prpnounced "sleeper" effect. Opinion 
change resulting from a conununication attributed to an "untrustworthy" 
(discounted) source showed an increment with time, and change from a 
"trustworthy" source, showed a decrement. Thus, the hypothesis was con-
firmed, but the effect was attributed to the source's being dissociated 
from the content, rather than to the "forgetting" of the source. However, 
there were no significant differences between the effectiveness of 
1Hovland, Lumsdaine, and Sheffield, op. cit., p. 197. 
2Ibid., p. 198. 
3c. I. Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source 
Credibility on Connnunication Effectiveness," Public Opinion Quarterly, 
XV (\-linter, 1951), pp. 635-650. 
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"trustworthy11 and "untrustworthy" sources in conveying facts. In this case, 
then, opinions were shown to have no effect upon learning. 
In a later experiment on the "sleeper" effect, t.Jeiss (1953) found 
that opinions of his Subjects did have an effect on their learning of a 
message about the hazards and benefits of smoking. Although there was no 
actual increase in opinion change in the direction of the discounted 
communication, as there had been in the Hovland-Weiss study, there was a 
differential decrease in the effectiveness, which could be attributed to 
dissociation of source and content. 1 The initial opposition to change is 
explained as the result of a conflict situation--"conflict between motives 
to accept and reject • • The appearance of the "sleeper" effect 
is dependent on a lessening of the conflict between the attitude of the 
Subject and the new attitude proposed in the communication: 
The later expression of the response inhibited by the 
conflict is, however, dependent on the st~engthening of the 
acceptance motive over the rejecting one. 
Weiss found "a definite relation between opinions and retention" of 
the material to be learned.4 More significantly, perhaps, he found that 
favorable opinion change taking place during the communication has an 
effect on retention equally as great as favorable opinion prior to the 
communication. 
1
walter tveiss, "A 'Sleeper' Effect in Opinion Change," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVIII (April, 1953), pp. 173-180. 
2 Ibid., p. 178. Cf. discussion of Edwards, suEra, p. 21. 
3Ibid., P• 179. 
4 Ibid., P· 179. 
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Berlo and Gulley (1957), however, in an experiment testing 
retention of "propositions," "assertions," and "evidence" as related to 
attitudes, found contradictory results. 1 There were no significant dif-
ferences in retention of any of the three kinds of statements between 
people having different attitudes with respect to the statements. 
These analyses definitely do not support a hypothesis that 
the amount of information retained after exposure to a mesiage is 
dependent on the initial attitudes toward the proposition. 
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The authors note that among those who changed significantly in the 
direction of the communication, 75% recalled the change proposal less well 
than had those who did not change, or who changed in the direction opposed 
to the proposa1. 3 
From these contradictory findings, it remains to be seen whether, 
and under what conditions, attitudes affect learning. In the earlier 
discussion of Levine and Murphy's experirnent, 4 some of the variables were 
mentioned which affect the learning and forgetting of material. The 
1n. K. Berlo and H. E. Gulley, "Some Determinants of the Effect of 
Oral Communication in Producing Attitude Change and Learning," Speech 
Monographs, XXIV CMarch, 1957), pp. 10-20. 
2Ibid., p. 17. 
3Recalling the findings of the experiments on "hedonic tone"--that 
"indifferent" material was remembered less well than pleasant material and 
the implications of Sherif's experiments with the autokinetic phenomenon 
for the ease with which attitudes can be changed in ambiguous situations, 
might it be that Subjects without organized attitudes regarding the pro-
posal tend to 11lean11 in that direction yet, experiencing little conflict 
nor even "pleasure" with the proposal, tend to forget it? The article 
does not provide enough information to enable the reader to evaluate the 
likelihood of such an occurence. 
4 Supra, p. 27, n. 2. 
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complexity of the processes revealed in the experiments discussed above 
corroborates the validity of the variables listed. Is it, then, possible 
to make any generalizations about the relation between attitude and 
learning? Plainly the relation is not a mechanical one. Attitudes do not 
necessarily prevent learning; nor does learning of material related to an 
attitude necessarily change the attitude. It seems advisable, therefore, 
to distinguish between learning of material presented and acceptance of 
the conclusions proposed. In Howland's words, 
,, 
In analyzing the diversity in results of prior studies 
we find it useful to employ the distinction • • • between the 
learning of the content of t~e communication and the motivation 
to accept its conclusions. If one remembers none of the argu-
ments from the communication, one's opinion about the issues may 
revert to its initial level. Or if one is no longer motivated to 
accept what was said, the opinion change will not persist. Thus, 
opinion change follmving exposure to a communication depends on 
retention both ~f the informational content and of the incentives. 
for acceptance. 
Hovland's view of the role of motivation in the relation between 
attitude and learning may be stated in terms of a formula: 
Change rv learning x acceptance 
Change is a function of the product of learning and acceptance. 
Thus, if there is a decrease either in retention of material presented or 
of motivation to accept the material, there will be a corresponding decrease 
in the amount of change produced. The amount of increment or decrement of 
change varies tvith the relative weight of the importance of "learningn and 
of "acceptance" in any communication. Hovland has found that opinion change 
is more a function of "learning" in some cases, and of "acceptance" in 
1 C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and 
Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), p. 244. 
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others. In the former case, higher intelligence or the "cognitive" 
approach of the subject is closely correlated with opinion change. In the 
latter case, the opinions of less intelligent persons were more likely to 
be changed in the directi0n of the communication. 1 
Hovland's distinction between "learningn and "acceptance, 11 his ac-
count of the functional relation between them in the process of attitude 
change, and his finding that a rational appeal was more effective.with 
more intelligent people and a non-cognitive appeal with the less intelli-
gent opened the door to further theoretical refinements. 
Sarnoff, Katz, and McClintock (1954) studied the motivational 
sources of attitudes and suggested that attempts to change attitudes 
should be appropriate to these sources. Three broad. categories of 
motivational sources were proposed:2 
1) The rational. Attitudes arising from rational sources 
are based on information or misinformation. They are most amenable 
to change by cognitively organized, fact·ual communications. 
2) Social reward-punishment. Having their genesis in 
social norms, and expectations of membership groups, these atti-
tudes can best be changed by communications which alter one's 
perception of the group position or which offer better rewards 
lc. I. Hovland, 11Changes in Attitude Through Communication, II ~­
nal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVI (July, 1951), pp. 424-437. 
2Irving Sarnoff, Daniel Katz, and Charles McClintock, "Attitude 
Change Procedures and Motivating Patterns," in Katz, Cartwright, et al., 
op. cit., pp. 305-312. Revised fnrun "The Motivational Basis of Attitude 
Change," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, LIX (January, 1954), 
pp. 115-124. 
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for adopting the new position. 
3) Ego-defense. These attitudes, intimately connected with 
one's image of himself, often the manifestation of an inner conflict 
and highly emotional, • 
may be approached by one of two methods: a) permissive catharsis. 
This method, which allows the Subject to give vent to the conflicts 
wit~in himself in a non-threatening context, is suitable only in 
face-to-face situations. b) Direct interpretation. This procedure 
is more adaptable to group and mass communications. It consists of 
presenting to the Subjects an explicit analysis of their behavior 
in psychological terms. Insight into their own defense mechanisms 
would be effected and they would be enabled to deal more directly 
with the sources of their internal conflicts. 
In an experiment based on this theoretical structure, it was found 
that prejudice'against Negroes, which is apparently motivated by ego-
defenses, was reduced by the method of direct interpretation (prescribed 
above for ego-defensive attitudes) and the effects were more permanent 
than when "rational,. arguments were employed. 1 This experimental evidence 
lends support to the theory of motivational sources proposed by Sarnoff, 
Katz, and McClintock. 
Summary of Experiments on Attitude Change 
Experimental design in the 1940's and 1950's has, in general, 
continued the trend toward more meaningful and naturalistic settings and 
= 
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materials. Theories of cognitive determination as opposed to emotional 
determination of attitudes and mental processes have found a common meet-
ing ground in these experiments, and both "determinants" have been seen to 
operate to varying degrees, along with social determinants and a host of 
lesser variables. The realization of the complexity of interaction of 
these variables has been one of the most important outcomes of this 
research. 
More particularly, it is seen that the relation between attitudes 
and learning is not a simple one. As in the experiments on emotions and 
learning, there is much contradictory evidence. But again some generali-
zations can be made: it is true that attitudes tend to be maintained and 
protected. Some of these experiments have, in stimulating resistance to 
attempts to change attitudes through communication, uncovered the sources 
and motivations of attitudes and the ways in which they protect themselves. 
Where these revelations have been used in attempts to change attitudes, 
they have met with significant success. But the principal value of the 
bulk of these experiments has been in their contribution to an understand-
ing of the workings of attitudes rather than in the uncovering of clear-
cut laws of attitude change. 
Effects of ]mplicit and Explicit Statements 
of Conclusions on Attitudes·-
Levine and Murphy, in the study which demonstrated the tendency of 
statements opposed to one's point of view to be forgotten more rapidly 
than those with which one agrees, pose the following question: 
A more important question is to ask what the individual 
will do with material which does not so obviously conflict with his 
= 
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autisms, yet nevertheless cannot be reconciled with them--when tye 
attack is more subtle, when the ego is less aware of the threat. 
In response to this query, a mnnber of the more recent studies have 
attempted to assess the effectiveness of implicit as compared with explicit 
recommendations for the holding of certain attitudes or opinions. Hovland 
and Mandell (1952) presented different communications on a single topic to 
two groups. The only difference between the messages was that in one of 
them the conclusion was explicitly stated, whereas in the other it was 
not. The explicit statement proved to be more effective in changing atti-
tudes. It was concluded that explicit statement will be more effective 
when the arguments are complicated and the topic relatively impe~sonal. 
However, the authors recognize that implicit statement may be better under 
certain circumstances~ 
Interesting further research is suggested with other kinds 
of issues, particularly ones with a higher degree of ego-involve-
ment. Such issues may permit the operation to a greater extent of 
some of the factors which are stress2d by psychotherapists in 
suggesting non-directive procedures. 
Thistlethwaite, DeHaan, and Kamenetsky (1955) questioned the 
findings of Hovland and Mandell, attributing them to a failure to distin-
guish between comprehension and acceptance of conclusions. 3 The 
1 Supra, p. 27. 
2c. I. Hovland and W. Mandell, "An Experimental Comparison of 
Conclusion-Drawing by the Communicator and the Audience," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, XLVII (July, 1952), p. 587. 
1D. L. Thistlethwaite, Henry DeHaan, and Joseph Kamenetsky, "The 
Effects of 1Directive' and 'Non-directive' Communication Procedures on 
Attitudes,n Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychologx, LI (July, 1955), 
pp. 107-113. 
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expertment, dealing with attitudes toward the Korean War, produced findings 
of "no significant difference" between the effectiveness of fmplicit and 
explicit communications in changing attitudes, even though the explicit 
message produced greater comprehension than did the implicit message. 
In the mass communication represented in the present study, 
it is clear that unaided conclusion-drawing is B£! associated 
with greater attitude change than conclusion drawiyg which occurs 
following explicit suggestion by the communicator. 
The authors conclude, as did Hovland and Mandell, with the sugges-
tion that research should be done with attitudes having a higher degree 
of ego-involvement. 
Hovland and Mandell had suggested that, with such attitudes, it 
might be appropriate to use methods ,analogous to those recommended by 
proponents of the non-directive school of psychoanalysis. 
The operation of non-directive therapy is outlined in the following 
statement from Carl Rogers, one of the founders of the non-directive 
approach to psychotherapy: 
The therapist by providing a consistent atmosphere of 
permissiveness and understanding removes whatever threat existed 
to prevent all perceptions of the self from emerging into figure. 
• • • It is then this complete absence of any factor which would 
attach the concept of s~lf, . . • which seems to permit • . • the 
reorganization of self. 
If "attitudes11 are thought of as part of the "concept of self," then 
a communication explicitly opposed to an attitude may be perceived as a 
threat to the self, especially if the identification of the attitude 
1 Ibid., p. 112. 
2c. R. Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Person-
ality," American Psychologist, II (September, 1947), p. 366. 
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with the self is very strong. 
Cantril calls such attitudes nego-attitudes~"' He describes them as 
• • • attitudes that determine the more or less enduring character 
of one's personal identity w·ith the values or norms incorporated in 
him. When there attitudes are situationally called for, we become 
personally involved, And when we do become personally involved, 
then our discrimination, judgment, perception, remembering, thiyk-
ing, and explicit behavior are accordingly modified or altered. 
To investigate the effect of egowinvolvement on learning, Wallen 
(1942) asked Subjects to rate themselves on a personality rating sheet. 
He altered the ratings in a systematic way and returned the "bogus" 
ratings to the subjects, telling them that these were ratings which 
someone else had made of them. Some time later, the Subjects were asked 
to recall the ratings which "others" had made of them. There was a signi-
ficant tendency for the Subjects selectively to forget the ratings which 
disagreed with their own self-ratings. There was no tendency selectively 
to forget the assignment of undesirable traits which they admitted to 
having themselves. When given a list of ratings applying to a'third 
person," recall of these ratings was random. Thus it was concluded that 
the selective forgetting of ratings not in harmony with their own self~ 
estimates was evidence of ego-involvement as a determining factor. 2 
Shaw and Spooner (1945) claim to have found evidence contradictory 
to Wallen's. Supposing the Subjects not to be ego-involved in personality 
ratings of a ttthird person," they asked the Subjects to rate certain 
lMuzafer Sherif and Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Ego Involve-
ments (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 194 7), p. 4. 
2Richard ~.J'allen, "Ego-involvement as a Determinant of Selective 
Forgetting," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, XXXVIII (January, 
1942), pp. 20-39. 
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individuals. The experimenter altered these ratings in systematic 
fashion and presented them to the Subjects as the ratings of the same 
persons by someone else. Again, as in the Wallen experiment, when the 
Subjects were asked to recall the "bogus" ratings,- they exhibited select-
ive forgetting of items which disagreed with their own ratings. Since 
this was, according to the authors, a non-ego-involving situation, the 
selective forgetting must be attributed to something else. They suggest 
that perhaps 
• • • an existing opinion establishes a predisposition to perceive 1 events in accord with the opinion and to ignore events that are not. 
This interpretation does not exclude "ego-involvement" as defined 
by Cantril, since our judgments of others may be related to our ego-
attitudes. In one sense, then, the results of Shaw and Spooner may. 
actually confirm rather than contradict Wallen's findings. The only 
truly non-ego-involved experiment was Wallen's presentation of the ratings 
of unknown "third persons" with respect to whom the Subjects could have 
had no attitudes. The Shaw and Spooner experiment failed in excluding 
"ego-involvement11 because, even though the Subjects' ratings were not 
self-ratings in the literal sense, they were so in the figurative sense 
that these ratings of "other" persons were their own judgments. 
These findings can be summarized in the words of Cantril: 
What the experiments on ego-involvement show is the 
necessity of recognizing the fact that the learning situation is 
differently organized for the individual when he feels that he 
lF. J. Shaw and Alice Spooner, uselective Forgetting when the 
Subject is Not Ego-involved," Journal of Experimental·Psychology, XXXV 
(June, 1945), p. 246. · 
is somehow involved and that this organization, this interest 
determination or interest setting as Bartlett calls iti affects 
what will be learned and how learning will take place. 
Summary 
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that the tendency of 
attitudes is. to maintain themselves in the face of manifold pressures to 
43 
change. The mechanisms of selective perception, cognitive structuring, and 
ego-defense (in the psychoanalytic sense) discussed here are augmented and 
' 
reinforced by the pressures of membership and reference-group norms, con-
temporary social trends, and broader cultural characteristics. Within 
the individual these mechanisms and social forces are brought to bear on 
each new stimulus. The variety of responses to stimuli is limited by the 
tendency of these forces, as Bartlett says, to "conventionalize" modes of 
perceiving, thinking, and behaving. 2 Although the number of alternative 
responses in a given socio-cultural context is great, it is still small in 
proportion to the potential variety of responses that could be made. The 
set of alternatives appropriate in one personal, social, and cultural 
situation may be inappropriate in another. 
In view of the power of the forces limiting the range of response, 
it is small wonder that attitudes seem resistant to change, or that infor-
mation congruent with attitudes is more readily received than that which 
is not congruent with them. The greater wonder is that some changes do 
1sherif and Cantril, op. cit., p. :1,30. 
2Bartlett, op. cit., p. 95 •. 
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take place. 
The experiment which follows is concerned with a particular phenome-
non wherein attitude maintenance may be observed: Sometimes, information 
incongruent with an attitude is received apparently without incurring 
resistance--yet the attitude remains unchanged. 
Here, the factors of cognitive organization, hedonic selectivity, 
evasion of propaganda, ego-involvement, response to non-directive treat-
ment, motivational sources of attitudes, and delayed after-effects will 
be. observed to come into play. 
CHAPTER II 
THE EXPERIMENT 
Hypothesis I 
Under what conditions does information incongruent with established 
attitudes manage to become included in an individual's cognitive organi-
zation? With reference to a specific example, hot-T did soldiers viewing 
the film "The Battle of Britain" ·manage to learn so tvell the spec~fic 
facts contained therein, whose implications pointed so clearly to the 
valiance and loyalty of the British soldiers ,and civilians, without having 
any appreciable effect on the.ir attitudes toward the British? If the film 
. 
· . .f' 
was successful in:changing certain specific opinions about the British, 
why were not the more general opinions so affected? 
Klapper has suggested that specific facts and opinions in a 
communication may be accepted because their relation to the larger or more 
central issue is not perceived, and defenses are not raised against 
"threatening" information: 
It may well be that the facts and opinions are not related 
to the desired attitude change sufficiently strongly to 
call the protective mediating forces into play; the communi-
cation is probably not recognized as relevant1to the attitude, as not salient, and mediation do~s not occur. 
1J. T. Klapper, '~hat We Know about the Effects of Mass Communica-
tions--The Brink of Hope, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (tolinter, 1957), 
p. 463. 
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It is this hypothesis which will be tested in the experiment to 
follow. 
Some of the early experiments on attitudes and learning seemed to 
indicate that attitudes dictated learning, and that learning reflected 
attitudes. The later experiments cited above showed that no such simple 
relationship existed, and that "learning of facts" and "acceptance of con-
elusions" drawn from those facts were not to be confused with each other. 
Klapper's hypothesis is an outgrowth of these experiments and the theories 
derived therefrom. But Klapper asks, not whether conclusions are accepted, 
but whether information is accepted. 1 He does not speculate as to what 
effect this information has on the attitude. In fact, heseems to be 
saying that there is no "communication" between the attitude and the 
accepted information. It is this lack of communication, this "non-
salience," which permits the information to "slip byn the "protective 
mediating forces." 
Such a state of affairs is thought to exist when the statements of 
conclusions in a persuasive communication are left implicit. This is a 
non-directive method of communication, analogous to that used in psycho-
therapy. It will be remembered that an important feature of non-directive 
technique is "the complete absence of any factor which would attack the 
"concept of the self. 11 2 In terms of Cantril's concept of ego-attitude, 
explicit counternorm conclusions constitute a threat to the "concept of the 
1The meaning of "acceptance" in Klapper's terminology is explained 
below. Infra, p. 47. 
2c. R. Rogers, "Some Observations on the Organization of Personal-
ity," American Psychologist, II(September, 1947!), pp. 358-368. 
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self." 
Hovland has found that on relatively impersonal topics an explicit 
conclusion is more effective incchanging opinions that is an implicit 
statement of conclusion. It remains to be seen whether the efficacy of an 
implicit conclusion would rise relative to that of an explicit conclusion 
to a degree directly proportional to the degree of ego-involvement. 
The distinction between "learning of facts" and "acceptance of 
conclusions" was noted above. 1 A further distinction may be drawn be-
tween "learning of factsu and "acceptance of facts." That is, one may 
"learn" a fact in the sense that he can reproduce it verbally, yet not 
necessarily accept it as "true." An implication of the Klapper hypothesis,, 
however, is that in some instances, the motivation not to accept the facts 
may be so strong as to prevent the learning of the facts, and that this; 
motivation not to accept the facts is a by-product of the motivation not 
to accept the conclusions. If it is objected that such a theory is similar 
to the earlier "naive" conception of a dictatorial relationship of attitude 
to learning, it should be noted that the phenomenon predicted here is said 
to occur under a particular set of circumstances; namely, when the con-
clusions stated in the communication are in opposition to an attitude 
characterized by a high degree of ego-involvement. When ego-involvement 
is high, according to this hypothesis, the reaction to an explicitly 
stated counternorm conclusion will be the breakdown of the distinction 
between learning and acceptance of the facts. This may be expected to 
manifest itself, under controlled experimental conditions, in differential 
1 Supra, p. 35. 
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learning between a communication in which the counternorm conclusion is 
tmplicitly stated and one in which the conclusion is explicitly stated. 
From this manifestation might be inferred the theory that under conditions 
of high ego-involvement, attitude toward the conclusion mediates between 
the learning and the acceptance of arguments on its behalf. 
For these reasons, demonstration of the Klapper hypothesis would 
seem most likely to occur when applied to attitudes that are highly ego-
involved. Differential acceptance of information (or "learning") is less 
likely to be exhibited when the attitudes are less highly ego-involved. 
Indirect support for this contention may be found in the early experiments 
on the relation of feeling to memory, where results were insignificant if 
not contradictory. 1 This was attributed to the low level of "meaningful-
ness" and/or the low level of conflict in the sttmulus material. 
The formal hypothesis, therefore, is as follows: 
Subjects indicating strong opposition to the conclusion 
will learn less well the facts presented in a communication 
when the conclusion is stated explicitly than when the conclusion 
remains unstated and tmplicit. 
Some Implications of the 
Klapper Hypothesis 
Although the context of Klapper's hypothesis is such as to explain 
the phenomenon of learning content without accepting conclusions, and 
despite the fact that for the purposes of this effort Klapper disclaims 
interest in ;what "happens" to the information after it has become 
cognitively accepted, it is interesting to speculate as to the possibilities 
1 Supra, p. 23. 
I 
I 
! 
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The -first possibility, of course, is that "nothing" will happen. 
Indeed, from the foregoing discussion and analysis and from the evidence 
of experiments cited, this appears most likely. 
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·The seco~d possibility is one alluded to in the discussion of the 
"sleeper effect." This is the possibility that the information might be 
called into play in a relevant context at some later time. 1 When applied 
in the_r~levant context, there is considerable likelihood that the infor-
mation will be "brought into communication" with the attitude. Under 
optimum circumstances (a condition rarely if ever obtained in the interac-
tion of attitudes and events) this would result in a radical reconstruction 
of the attitude. Under less-than-ideal circumstances, there might be 
some modification of the attitude accompanied, perhaps, by some distortion 
of the information as originally perceived. Finally, under the "worst" 
conceivable circumstances, t~e relevant context might contradict the 
information formerly accepted and reinforce the old attitude. Sarnoff, 
Katz, and McClintock have posited three motivational sources for attitudes: 
the rational, the social rewards-and-punishments, and the ego-defense. 2 
Does this second possibility--the possibility of information being called 
into play in a relevant context at a later time--apply to all three 
sources? Its application to rationally motivated attitudes would appear 
to be limited since the implicit approach is inherently ambiguous and in-
efficient. Rationally motivated attitudes are more effectively treated by 
more direct means. The implicit approach is expected to be more effective 
1 Supra, p. 31. 
2 Supra, p. 36. 
so 
with the greater degree of ego-involvement. A relatively high degree of 
ego-involvement, while not necessarily equivalent to ego-defense as defined 
by Sarnoff et al., is likely to. be resistant to the "informational" 
when "information" simply means "facts." However, if "informationtt as 
used here is understood to include not only factual information, but also 
implications of social reward and punishment, and strategically planned 
ttdirect interpretation" of ego-defense, perhaps the valuable contribution 
of Sarnoff can be incorporated into the "high ego-involvement--implicit 
conclusion" strategy. At the same time, however, it will be remembered 
from the Cooper and Jahoda studies of "evasionn1 that the more ambiguous 
stimuli used in the implicit approach are subject to distortion, and this 
is likely to counteract the e~fectiveness of the non-directive technique 
in some degree. 
Design of Proposed Experiment 
The purpose of the proposed experiment, however, is not to.inquire 
as to whether attitudes can be changed by the non-directive method of 
implicit statement. It is, rather, to ,discover the conditions under 
which information contrary to one's attitudes may be incorporated into 
' One IS COgnitive Structure Without neceSs-arily exerting an immediate influ-
ence on the structure of the relevant attitudes. 
To this end, .Klapper proposes the following experiment: 
A rather simple controlled experiment might be set up, 
for example, in which two groups were exposed to communications, 
1 Supra, p. 28 f. 
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one of which explicitly pointed out the tmplications for attitude 
change of accepting the objective facts. In line with the inter-
pretation presented above, we would hypothesize that in the latter 
communication the objective facts themselves would be more likely 
to be rejected. Such an-experiment would differ from the numerous 
studies of "implicit" vs. "explicit" conclusions 'tvhich have to date 
been primarily concerned with whether the conclusions rather £han 
the facts themselves were more or less likely to be accepted. 
Hypothesis II· 
The second hypothesis is derived from the first and depends on the 
substantiation of the first hypothesis. If the first hypothesis were to 
be substantiated, it would be important to ascertain whether the amount 
learned is a funotion of opposition to the conclusions as well as of the 
impl~c~tness or explicitness of the statements of conclusions. Subjects 
in agreement with the conclusions, being less res.istant to facts associa-
ted with those conclusions, may be less likely to exhibit differential 
learning as a function of the implicitness or explicitness of these con-
elusions. Perhaps learning would be more highly correlated with "intelli-
gence" than with attitude for those in favor of the conclusion. 2 
The second hypothesis is as follows: 
The difference between learning of an implicit and learning 
of an explicit statement will be smaller for those favoring the 
conclusion than for those opposing it. 
1 Klapper, op. cit., p. 463 footnote. 
2conversely, the more "intelligent" person who opposed the conclu-
sions may be able to "see through" the implicit communication. It would 
be interesting to know whether he would exhibit as much of and the same 
kind of resistance as the less intelligent individual who receives the 
implicit communication, Cf. supra, pp. 28-29. 
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Formal Procedure 
The experUnent consisted of four stages; the administration of an 
attitude questionnaire, the presentation of the experimental communication, 
an Umnediate after-test consisting of a fact quiz, and a delayed after-test 
of retention. The attitude whose operation is to be investigated is "atti-
tude toward birth control."l 
The topic of birth control was chosen, let it be noted, with some 
reluctance. But the reason for this reluctance was the very feature which 
suited the topic to this experiment; namely, the delicacy of the topic 
and the affective overtones with which it is endowed. It was felt after 
an investigation of several other topics, that this one offered the 
greatest chance of demonstrating the phenomenon with which the hypothesis 
is concerned, i.e. differential learning of implicit and explicit communi-
cations when ego-involved opposition is present. 
Experimental Groups 
The test of the first hypothesis involved three groups of subjects 
opposed to birth control. All groups except the third--the "basic" 
group--underwent each of the five stages of the experiment. The "basic" 
group did not receive the communication, and their scores on the fact and 
retention quizzes were used to find the general level of information on the 
subject and to find out whether prior knowledge was a function of prior 
attitude. In addition, by comparing the immediate after-test score Of .:tl.he 
1
see appendices for copies of the attitude questionnaire, the two 
forms of the experimental communication, and the fact-quiz. 
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"basic" group with their retention test scores, it was possible to discover 
whether there were uncontrolled changes in the general information level 
during the course of the experiment. Such changes might arise if, contrary 
to the instructions of the experimenter, there had been discussion of the 
communication outside of the classes in which the experiment had been 
conducted. 
The other two groups, each treated separately, received identical 
treatment except that one group, designated the "implicit" group, read a 
communication the factual contents of which give implicit support to 
arguments favoring birth control. The other group, designated the "explicit 
group, read a communication identical to the first in all respects. except 
that it included sevefal statements which explicitly recommended birth 
control. 
The test of the second hypothesis involved the same three groups 
as that of the first, supplemented by.Subjects known to favor birth con-
trol. The fact-quiz grades were used to compare learning of the contents 
of the implicit or the explicit communication with the Subjects' attitudes 
as inferred by the attitude questionnaire. 
The Attitude Scale 
In order to ascertain the strength and position of the attitudes of 
the Subjects, the Thurstone scale of "Attitudes Toward Birth Contv:HD1 11 was 
1 
employed. A Thurstone scale consists of about twenty-two carefully 
1c. K. A. Wang and L. L. Thurstone, "Attitude Toward Birth Control," 
The Measurement of Social Attitudes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1930), Scale No. 21, Form A. 
selected statements expressing different opinio~wh~ch are, according to 
the assumptions of the Thurstone method, ranged at equal intefvals along 
a continuum from strong opposition to strong favor of the "attitude-
object." The individual responding to the questionnaire merely indicates 
agreement or disagreement with each of the opinions (or "items") stated. 
His "score" on the questionnaire is stated in terms of the value of the 
median item among those with which he has agreed, each item having been 
assigned a numerical value corresponding with its degree of favor or 
opposition toward the attitude object. 
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The decision to use the Thurstone method of attitude measurement 
was based on the assumption, common to that of the method, that the re-
sponses would indicate the direction of the Subject's attitude (pro or 
con) and the extremity of the attitude ("more" or "less" pro and con). It 
was assumed that the degree of ego-involvement could be inferred from the 
extremity of the score on the Thurstone scale. 
The scale employed in the present experiment was constructed by 
Thurstone and Wang in 1930 and for this reason its utility to our purposes 
was limited. Ideally, such a scale is constructed by selecting opinion 
statements and "judges" of the scale values of those statements from the 
same "universe" or "population" as that from which the experimental 
Subjects are to be drawn. This would mean, in the present instance, that 
the attitude questionnaire would consist of statements of opinions about 
birth control from college-students in 1959 in the United States (if not 
more particularly in New England). Since the scale constructed by Thur-
stone and \~ang in 1930 does not conform to this requirement, the scale 
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values of the items may no longer be assumed to obtain. Since the 
"meanings" of some of the statements have changed with time, and the 
meaning of the coneept "birth control" has been altered--notably by the 
recognition by the Roman Catholic Church of the practice, under specified 
conditions, of the "rhythm method" of preventing conception--the numerical 
scale values of the opinion items have shifted along the continuum; and 
the entire attitude continuum, as embodied in this particular scale, has 
also shifted with respect to the attitudes of the population as a whole. 
Therefore, the responses to the Thurstone scale of attitudes 
toward birth control were scored by a method which does not make the 
assumptions to which the scale no longer conforms. The method will be 
explained later. 
The Experimental Communication 
There were to be two printed communications: one providing 
arguments which give implicit support to proposals for birth control, the 
other providing both implicit support and explicit recommendation for the 
practice of birth control. The experimenter's problem was to create two 
communications which were sufficiently similar so as not to introduce 
extraneous variables (e.g. readability, differences in content, etc.) and 
at the same time neither revealed the implicit conclusion too openly nor 
made the explicit seem incongruous. 
A satisfactory solution was found in a publication by Karl Sax. 1 
1Karl Sax, ''The Population Explosion," Headline Series, No. 120 
(November 20, 1956), pp. 35-45. This periodical is published by the 
Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated. 
One of the chapters in this work was concerned with the relation 
between industrialization arid the accelerating rates of depletion of 
na~ural resources. Occasional references were made to population growth 
as a factor hindering the industrialization of underdeveloped countries 
and to the need for immediate and widespread population control·· if indus~ 
trialization is to take place before resources run out and if resources 
are to be made to last until substitutes are developed. 
The 11explicit11 communication consisted of the chapter virtually as 
it was written. 
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The experimenter found that the references to population growth and 
the need for birth control could be excised without substantially altering 
the facts presented. Facts about population growth w·ere deleted because 
it was felt that they were too strongly suggestive of the implicit con-
clusion. Thereby was created the "implicit" communication. 
In order further to lessen the' likelihood that the implicit 
conclusion would be "given away" by chance or design, the presentation of 
the communication was to follow the administration of the attitude 
questionnaire by an interval of two weeks, and different persons would 
administer the questionnaire and the communication-fact-quiz presentation. 
Maximization of the effect of the explicit statement of conclusion, 
it was felt, would be accomplished by interspersing statements of. the 
conclusion throughout the message. ·The author having constructed the 
chapter in precisely this manner, no modification was necessary. 
The article was attributed to the United Nationa organization on 
the assumption that the prestige of this "source" would be high enough to 
reinforce the weight of the explicit communication without sensitizing the 
= 
recipients of the implicit communication to the nature of the conclusion. 
The Fact-Quiz 
The first fact-quiz was to be administered immediately after the 
reading of the communication. Referring solely to facts presented in the 
message, it consisted of two brief essay questions, eleven sentence-
completion items involving sixteen responses, and three true-false 
statements. 
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The essay questions were used to reveal whether the subjects had 
perceived the conclusions. It was expected that the conclusion would not 
be perceived when implicit. Widespread recognition of the implicit con-
clusion would indicate either a) that the implicit statement was,,not 
implicit enough; b) that the Subjects had heard about the explicit commu-
nication from other.Subjects who had already taken it; c) that the message 
had been spontaneously associated with the attitude questionnaire. 
On the other hand, it was expected that when stated explicitly, 
the conclusion would be recognized by virtually all Subjects. Failure 
to mention the explicitly stated conclusion in the essay questions would 
be interpreted as an indication that the conclusion had not been suffi-
ciently explicit or, in some cases, might indicate defensive avoidance. 
Objective-type questions were used for the bulk of the quiz to facilitate 
comparisons of scores and, if not to eliminate arbitrariness in scoring, 
at least to equalize it for all Subjects. 
Retention Test 
The retention test was deemed necessary not only to ascertain the 
amount remembered, but also because of findings mentioned in the previous 
= 
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chapter to the effect that differential effects of communications 
occasionally take time to manifest themselves. 1 This has been demonstrated 
most dramatically in the phenomenon known as the "sleeper" effect. 2 It 
may be that the explicit conclusion acts as a "discounting factor" against 
the learning of the factual content of the communication. If this were 
the case, and if f.or some reason the motivation to accept the facts were 
increased relative to the motivation to reject the conclusions (for 
example, if the Roman Catholic Church should make a pronouncement about 
the need to conserve natural resources) there might be a differential 
decrement in retention between the groups receiving the implicit and the 
. . 3 
explicit statements. This is, ho~-Tever, unlikely. ·A somewhat more likely 
effect to be revealed mn the retention test wouwd be that the conflict 
arising from the explicit statement remains unrelieved. Then retention 
· of the explicit communication might decrease at a greater rate than the 
rate at which retention of the implicit communication decreases. 4 
Attitude After-test 
No after-test of attitudes was given, as the experiment was solely 
concerned with the operation of "forces for stasis" arising from attitudes, 
1 Cf. Gilbert~ supra, p. 20; Rapaport, supra,p.24; Hovland, Lumsdaine, 
and Sheffield, supra. p. 31; Hovland and Weiss, supra, p. 32; t-Jeiss, supra, 
P•. 33. 
2 Supra. pp. 32-33. 
3This is a modification of Weiss's explanation of the "sleepern 
e~fect, supra, p. 33. 
4cf. supra. p. 27, discussion of Levine and Murphy. 
obtaining prior to presentation of the stimulus. Further comment on this 
decision is deferred until the data and analysis have been presented. 
Procedure 
The four stages set forth in the outline of the "formal procedure" 
were carried out in practice: the attitude questionnaire, presentation of 
experimental communication, immediate aft~r-test, and retention, or 
delayeg after-test. 
Experimental Groups 
Groups of subjects were obtained from t'tiTO New England colleges, one 
of which contained a large proportion of Roman Catholics who, it was 
assumed, would manifest strong opposition to the birth control proposal. 
The other college was a non-sectarian institution whose student body was 
principally Protestant and Jewish, although there was a considerable 
number of Catholics. 
Since it tvas desirable to present the communication on "Industrial 
Development" in as natural a setting as possible, the groups were obtained 
from courses in economics or related areas and permission to conduct the 
experiment during class meetings was obtained from the professors in-
volved. The predominantly Roman Catholic groups were approached through 
a course in "Money and Banking," while the "mixed" groups were reached in 
the context of a course on "Major Economies of the World." The former 
group met in three sections in consecutive hours, which suited the experi-
mental design in nearly ideal fashion. The first section would serve as 
the "implicit" group; the second section as "explicits"; and the third as 
"controls." 
The class sections of the course on "Major Economies of the World" 
(the "mixed" groups) were four in number. They met on different days of 
the week, which was a less nearly ideal arrangement. Two of the smaller 
sections·were designated as "implicit" groups in order to make maximum 
use of the Subjects available. 
Because of the Church's position on the practice of birth control 
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and the delicacy of the issue, the authorities of the Roman Catholic college 
barred the experimenter from further access to those groups after the 
attitude questionnaire had been administered. In order to compensate for 
·the relatively low!! thus ptoduced, more Subjects "t-Tere obtained from the 
second college. Additional groups in Economics not being available, the 
groups obtained consisted of the enrollments in three courses: two sopho-
more level courses in Communication and one senior course in "i>olitics and 
Government." 
The approach to these groups differed slightly from the approach to 
those in "Major Economies." The "Major Economies" groups were approached 
in class sections corresponding to the rrimplicit," "explicit," and "control" 
treatments. The other groups were approached in lecture periods of each 
course and were divided into matched rrt~eatment" groups on the basis of 
their scores on the attitude scale. Thus the completed experiment contains 
data from twelve groups: three different treatments in each of four 
courses. 
Attitude Questionnaire 
The attitude questionnaires were printed on two sides of one sheet 
0 
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of paper. On the first side were instructions for responding to the scale 
and space for personal data about the Subject; on the reverse side were 
repeated condensed instructions and the list of twenty opinion "items." 
The personal information requested included name, religious affilia-
tion, marital status, sex, age, college, and class year. It was realized 
that Subjects might be reluctant to reveal their names and that without 
anonymity their responses might not be as honest as when anonymity is 
assure~, but it was necessary to be able to identify the attitude of an 
individual with his score on the fact-quizzes without giving him reason to 
a~sociate the two stimuli. Identification by name seemed to be the only 
method of accomplishing this. The Subjects were,told, therefore, that their 
responses to the attitude questionnaire would be "correlated and cross-
tabuiliated with results from similar studies to be made next year" and that 
identification by name was necessary. Assurance was given them that their 
scores as individuals would be known to no one but the experimenter. 
Approximately 2% of attitude questionnaires were returned unsigned. 
The request for the Subjectts religious affiliation needs little 
explanation. It was thought that differences or similarities between 
nominal affiliation and attitude as reflected in the Subject 1 s responses 
to the attitude questionnaire might bear a significant relation to learning 
of the content of the communication. 1 
1In private conversations, two of the partic~pants provided the ex-
perimenter with information relevant to this speculation. One of them, 
acknowledging the apparent conflict between her Roman Catholic affiliation 
and her favorable attitude toward birth control as expressed in her re-
sponses to the Thurstone scale, said "I 1m a modern woman." 
The other Subject, a male student, explained that he responded as 
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The request for information as to marital status and sex was made to 
enable the experimenter to find out, if deemed relevant, whether differences 
were associated with these variables. The request for information as to 
age, college, and year was included primarily to soften the edge of the 
other questions, which might,have been construed as excessively inquisitive. 
Instructions for responding to the items on the reverse side were 
simply to double-check those with which one agreed strongly, to single-
check those with which one agreed, to mark with an (X) those with which one 
disagreed, and to p.lace a question mark (1) next to items to which one felt 
he could not respond. 
Because of the somewhat out-dated nature of the Thurstone scale, 
the meaning of the term "birth controP' in the present context (1959) was 
quite different from its meaning in the context of the scale. As noted 
1 
above, the approval by the Roman Catholic Church of the "rhythm" method 
of birth control makes it possible for a Catholic who opposes artificial 
methods, to which the 1930 scale refers exclusively, to indicate some 
degree of favorableness to the practice. Such an individual responding 
to the scale makes a mental reservation, in the form of an !·'implicit 
"a good Catholic"--which he sincerely believes himself to be--but that in 
practice he would favor birth control. Unfortunately, this Subject did 
not undergo the "communication" stage of the experiment. It does not seem 
unreasonable, however, to suggest the hypothesis that a person such as 
this one might indicate his concealed predisposition by learning more of 
the content of the counternorm communication that a person whose behavioral 
predisposition is more consistent with his "publicrr attitude. 
1 Supra, pp. 54-55. 
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verbalization" to the effect that "I can agree with this statement on the 
assumption that it means natural control under the conditions specified 
by the Church.n 
The experimental communication carried a recommendation which con-
forms in no way with the position of the Roman Catholic Church, nor with 
its definition of "acceptable" methods of birth control. In order to 
maximize the predictive value of the attitude scale in relation to re-
spouses to the communication, the meaning of the term nbirth control" in 
the Thurstone scale had to be comparable with its meaning in the communi-
cation. For this reason, the Subjects were told, prior to the administra-
tion of the attitude questionnaire, that the term "birth control" was to 
be understood as referring only to artificial methods, i.e. the use of 
contraceptives, and not to the rhythm method. 1 
The general meaning of the term is not the only feature of the scale 
that has changed in thirty years. Individual items are differentially 
associated with the general meaning, so that some of them have been 
"juggled around" on the continuum. Not only may their location on the 
scale (the:i:r "scale value") have changed, but also they may have become more 
ambiguous in their range of meaning, so that as individual items they may 
no longer have precise predictive value. For exampilie, it was found that 
1This announcement elicited audible reactions from>some of the Sub-
jects, such as gasps, sharp intakes of breath, shuffling of feet, and 
general restlessness. It is more than amusing to speculate that the 
attitudes of the subjects might be more accurately reflected in these 
involuntary responses than in the attitude scale which they were about to 
take. 
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even among Subjects indicating strong opposition to birth control, there 
was a sizable proportion of favorable responses to an item which in 1930 
would have indicated rather strong favor of birth control. The item reads 
~irth control information should be available to everybody. 1 
This response on the part of persons opposed to birth control 
indicates that the scale value of this item has shifted toward the negative 
pole of the scale. It probably occupies a position nearer the middle or 
neutral area of the continuum, as it finds almost unanimous agreement among 
persons favoring birth control as well as substantial support among those 
opposed. 
In view of this, the scoring method used avoided both the use of 
the scale values assigned by Thurstone and the assumption of equal intervals 
between positions of items spaced along the continuum. The "new" method , 
assumes that items have not reversed themselves; h~e. that an item con-
sidered favorable in 1930 has not become an unfavorable item in 1959. But 
items in the neutral range according to judgments in 1930, having possibly 
moved up or down the scale since that time, are disregarded when scoring 
according to the new method. 
The method is simply to count a favorable response as "plus one" and 
an unfavorable response as "minus one." Favorable responses include not 
only agreement with ttems favorable to birth control, but also disagreement 
with items opposed to birth control. The same procedure is used in scoring 
unfavorable responses. No d'ifferentiation was made between responses 
1Thurstone and Wang, op. cit. 
·• 
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indicating strong agreement and those indicating simply "agreement." Items 
marked with a question mark (?) were not counted as responses on either 
side. By the simple process of counting the favorable responses (plus-
ones) and adding them to the unfavorable responses (minus-ones), a single 
numerical value is achieved which by its sign (plus or minus) indicates 
the direction of the attitude (favorable to birth control or unfavorable 
to it). It is assumed that the size of the number bears a direct relation 
to the extremity of the attitiude. 1 
The Communication 
The arrangement of the groups to receive the experimental communica-
tion has been discussed above. 2 
The three treatments (implicit, explicit, and control) were 
administered to their respective groups in separate rooms. In the case 
of those subjects enrolled in "Major Economies of the World," the groups 
were equivalent to the class sections, which met on different days of the 
week. The communications and fact-quiz were justified to the "Major Econo-
mies of the World" groups as part of a study being made by the professor, 
who is considering the addition of new materials for the course next year 
and wants to know how students 'tvill "react" to it. In order to minimize 
1A similar method was used by Weiss when he used a Thurstone-Wang 
scale of att it.ude toward treatment of criminals. Weiss noted that "the 
change in attitude object as well as the lapse of time between the develop-
ment of the test and its current use precludes the use of the original 
scale values other than as an index of order." See Walter Weiss, "The 
Effects on Opinions of a Change in Scale Judgments,rr Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, LVIII (March, 1959), p. 330, n. 4. 
2 Supra, p. 60. 
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the likelihood of the explicit conclusion being revealed to subjects in the 
"implicit" group, the implicit treatment was presented to the first section, 
the explicit treatment to the second, and the control to the third. Al-
though ideally the control treatment might better have come between the 
implicit and the explicit exposures, it was placed last because the last 
section was the smallest, and larger groups were needed for the experimen-
tal treatments. In order to prevent the control group from being "contami-
nated" by information from the explicit group, the latter was asked to 
refrain from discussing the experiment until it had been comp&eted. This 
was done also to prevent "leakage" to class members of the other three 
courses involved in the experiment. However, the implicit treatment group 
was ~ told to refrain from discussing the communication, since they 
were still not aware of its connection with the attitude scale and it was 
thought desirable to avoid sensitizing them to the true nature of the 
experiment. Such sensitization would be more likely to encourage open 
discussion of the communication on the part of those receiving the 
implicit message. 
In the case of the communication courses and the politics course 
each course was approached during lectures in which there was no division 
by class section. This enabled the experimenter to divide them into 
groups matched according to their scores on the attitude scale, as noted 
earlier. 1 The communications and fact-quiz were justified to students in 
these courses as "experiments in communication effectiveness." 
1 Supra, p. 53. 
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As all three treatments were administered simultaneously in 
separate rooms, it was not necessary to take 11security precautions" against 
leakage of information from one treatment group to another. But other 
precautions were necessary. There was a small amount of dupl£cation of 
enrollment between some of the courses from which the Subjects were 
drawn. Steps were taken to assure that individuals having participated 
in the experiment in earlier groups would be assigned the ~ame treatment 
as before. Thereby, a person who had received the explicit statement 
earlier would be assigned to a group receiving the explicit statement. If 
he were placed in the implicit group, there would be the danger of his 
remarking aloud that the ·earlier treatment had had "something to do with 
birth control." Sens itization• .of the impl~cit g~Coup would, of course 
interfere with the test of the hypothesis. 
Immediate Fact Quiz 
The design of the fact-quiz has been discussed above. 1 
Upon presentation of the communication to be read, the Subjects were 
told that they would be "asked to respond to a few questions about it" 
but that it would not count on their course grade. This practice was 
instituted after the first presentation because some Subjects were apparent-
ly inattentive to the communication for reasons other than defensive avoid-
ance. At the same time, it was expected that the tendency toward 
heightened motivation to attend to the communication in anticipation of 
being "quizzed" would be minimized by the assurance that the quiz score 
1 Supra, p. 58. 
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would not "count" on the course grade. 
Scoring. The essay-type questions, designed to reveal whether the 
conclusion had been properly perceived, were coded as plus, zero, or minus; 
plus (+) signifying that the birth control proposal had been recognized; 
zero (0) indicating that population was mentioned but not in connection 
with birth control; minus (-) meaning complete absence of indication that 
the conclusion had been perceived. 
The point-value of hhe objective-type questions was weighted 
according to the difficulty or the "newness" of the information requested 
as judged by the experimenter. 
Retention Test 
The retention test, identical to the immediate fact-quiz, was 
administered to the Subjects without forewarning one week after the 
communication and fact-quiz. This was the final contact with the 
experimental groups. 
Unforeseen contingencies _ 
In the course of conducting the experiment, there were a number of 
extraneous variables.for which allowance or preparation had not been made 
in the formal design. 
1) The termination of the participation of the Roman Catholic 
group seemed likely to reduce the number of persons in the sample opposed 
to birth control despite the effort to compensate by enlisting other 
groups from the nonsectarian institution. Strong social reinforcement of 
opposition to birth control was likely to be present in the predominantly 
Roman Catholic group; "ego-involvement" with respect to the issue was 
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expected to be relatively high; and the differential effects of implicit 
as compared with explicit statement of the counternorm proposal would have 
been most clearly evident here if the hypothesis were correct. 
In contrast to the social and situational reinforcement in the 
predominantly Roman Catholic group setting, the Catholics at the non-
sectarian college are subjected to vatious conflicting norms of both a 
religious and secular nature. The mere fact that these Catholics had 
chosen to attend a non-sectarian institution and that the others had 
chosen a parochial institution is evidence of a nself-selection" process 
from which may be inferred that the former are likely to adhere less 
closely to the orthodox positLon than the latter. The former's opposition 
to birth control, even when clearly manifested in the responses to the 
attitude scale, may be less ego-involved. 
For these reasons the mechanism suggested by the hypothesis could 
be expected to be less strongly operative in this experiment than was 
originally expected. 
2) Among the courses involved in the experiment there was some 
duplication of enrollment~ Although the amount was small, there was a 
possibility that remarks by a Subject who had participated previously in 
the experiment might sensitize the other participants in the later experi-
mental group. Steps were taken to minimize the likelihood of such an 
occurrence, but reports from those assi~ting the experimenter indicate 
that the steps were not wholly effective. Prior to dividing one lecture 
meeting into the three treatment groups, one ~ubject who was enrolled in 
another of the courses involved, asked the instructor aloud, "Is this that 
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birth control thing AGAIN?" 
3) Because of low and irregular attendance at class meetings, the 
number of Subjects actually completing the entire series was smaller than 
had been anticipated. As the population at the non-sectarian institution 
was heavily skewed in the direction of favorable attitudes toward birth 
control, the number of subjects who were opposed to birth control and who 
completed the battery was small. 
Again there is a possibility of a self-selective factor operating 
here. Subjects who were present at all three class or lecture ~eetings 
were likely to be different in some way from those who were present at only 
one meeting. The particular way or ways in which they differed are not 
within the scope of this discussion, but it seems a fair generalization 
to state that Subjects present at all meetings--i.e. Subjects who were 
available for testing--were more highly motivated, for whatever reasons, 
than those not present. From the discussion in Chapter One it will be 
remembered that "motivation" is intimately bound up ~vith attitudes and 
perception and cognitive processes. 
Thus, poor attendance could contribute to a lessening of the effect 
predicted by the hypothesis. 
4) There appeared to be some degree of hostility on the part of a 
substantial proportion of individuals both favorable to the proposal and 
opposed to it. Hostility as a direct result of the experiment may be of 
interest, or even of value to the experimenter; but hostility as a result 
of factors "outside" the experimental situation--that is, hostility against 
which there is no control nor for which there is any measure--can distort 
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the results in a manner unanalyzable. This may have been the case here. 
The context of the experiment is as follows: The final stages of the ex-
periment were conducted during the last class meetings of the term. Some 
of the students present were anxious to review the term's work in prepara-
tion for final examinations. They may have regarded the experiment as a 
waste of their time under these circumstances. A group of seniors in 
another class had been told that they would not have to take the final 
examination because their previous work had been satisfactory, but they 
had been urged to attend class lest they place their final grade in 
jeopardy. The experimenter was told by one of the seniors that her class-
mates were resentful of being compelled to attend. It is possible that 
some 6f this resentment might have been "transferred" to the experiment 
and the responses thereby distorted. 
In courses where there had been duplication of enrollment, Subjects 
who had already taken the battery once were reported to have announced 
this fact with some measure of exasperation in their voices. If this 
exasperation was communicated to other Subjects it may have colored their 
perception of the stimuld. presented to them. It is difficult if not 
impossible to predict the direction and the magnitude of effect this 
might have upon their responses. It must simply be noted as the 
introduction of an uncontrolled variable into the experimental variables. 
Summary 
Two working hypotheses were stated. The first one predicted that 
among persons opposed to a conclusion there would be differential learning 
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of implicit as compared with explicit messages. The second predicted that 
the learning differential would be larger for the group opposing the 
conclusion than for a group favoring it. 
In the first hypothesis, the independent variable is the implicitness 
or explicitness of the statement of conclusion; the dependent variable is 
the "amount learned" as measured by scores on a fact quiz. 
The independent variable in the second hypothesis is the Subject's 
attitude, i.e. favor or disfavor toward the conclus.ion. The dependent 
variable is the size of the difference between learning of the implicit 
and of the explicit messages as measured by comparing the fact quiz scores 
of each. 
Chosen for experimental treatment was the topic 11birth control." 
Groups were obtained which were expected to conform to the conditions set 
forth in the hypothesis; i.e. one group which was expected to be highly 
ego-involved and opposed to birth control and one group which was expected 
to be favorable toward, if not "ego-involved," in the issue. The former 
group alone would be used for the test of the first hypothesis, and both 
groups for the test of the second.hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, the group opposed to birth control was withdrawn from 
the experiment after the first stage (the attitude scale) had been completed. 
Therefore the second group was enlarged. Responses of subjects in the 
second group who had indicated opposition to birth control were analyzed 
separately from the responses of subjects favoring birth control. The new 
group thus formed served as a substitute for the "lost" group. 
The formal procedure of the test was seen to consist of four stages: 
74 
1. Administration.of an attitude scale; 
2. Presentation of an experimental communication, 
3. Administration of an immediate fact-quiz, and 
4. Administration of a delayed fact-quiz to test retention. 
Attitude toward birth·control was measured by a Thurstone scale 
using a modified scoring m~thod. The score thus derived would be used 
to distinguish between Subjects favoring and Subjects opposed to birth con-
trol. 'The questionnaire included a request for spec_ific items of informa-
tion, such as name, religious affiliation, sex, marital status, and age. 
The experimental stimulus was presented two weeks after the attitude 
questionnaire, and consisted of a printed communication entitled "Industrial 
Development." It was given to groups of subjects in one of two forms, 
. ' 
either implicitly giving support to arguments for birth control, or 
explicitly recommending it. The groups receiving the implicit message 
were physically separated from those receiving the explicit message. 
I 
Immediately after the reading of the communication, a fact quiz was 
given. It consisted of eleven sentence-completion items, three true-false 
items, and two "open-end" questions. These last were designed to reveal 
whether the Subject had perceived correctly the intended conclusion. 
Differential learning was expected to be exhibited in the responses to the 
objective-type :i:tems. 
One week after the learning test, a retention test was given. It 
consisted of the same fact-quiz as the first test, and was expected to 
reveal more clearly the differential effectiveness of the implicit and 
explicit communications, especially among Subjects opposed to birth control. 
The retention test concluded the experiment. 
Several unforeseen contingencies were noted. These may have 
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counteracted the controls provided in the experimental design. If this did 
occur, the evidence supporting the hypothesis was probably weakened. · The 
principal uncontrolled factors were: 
1. The withdrawal of the Roman Catholic group, which was, of 
course, predominantly opposed to birth control; 
2. Possible "leakage" of informationabout the experiment because 
of duplication of membership among the groups employed; 
3. Low and irregular attendance at the classes in which the 
experiment was conducted; 
4. Indications of uncontrolled hostility not necessarily resulting 
from the experiment itself, which may nevertheless have colored the 
Subjects' responses. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
It will be recalled that two hypotheses were stated: 
1) Persons with ego-involved opposition to the conclusions in a 
communication will learn less well the facts presented when the conclu-
sion is stated explicitly than when the conclusion remains unstated and 
implicit. 
2) The difference between learning of an implicit and learning of 
an explicit statement will be smaller for those favoring the conclusion 
than for those opposing it. 
Students enrolled in four courses were divided into three sections 
per course, corresponding to the three treatments of the experiment: 
implicit communication, explicit communication, and no communication. The 
last mentioned group is labelled the 11basic" group, since their scores 
on the fact quiz represent the basic level of information concerning the 
topic of communication, combined with correct responses which might have 
been made purely by chance. 
For purposes of analysis, the four course sections receiving the 
same treatment were treated as a single group. Each of the three treatment 
groups was further subdivided into two groups on the basis of their atti-
tude toward birth control as determined by the modified Thurstone scale. 
For each treatment, then, there was-a group favoring birth control (here-
after designated the "pratt group) and a group opposed to birth control 
(to be termed the "con" group). 
To simplify the analysis and discussion to follow, the following 
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terms will be employed in referring to the several groups: 
1) Implicit pro - receives the communication in which the 
conclusion is implicitly stated; favors the conclusion. 
2) Implicit con - receives the communication in which the 
c.onclusion is implicitly stated; opposes the conclusion. 
3) Explicit pro - receives the communication in which the 
conclusion is explicitly stated; favors the conclusion. 
4) Explicit con - receives the communication in which the 
conclusion is explicitly stated; opposes the conclusion. 
5) Basic pro - receives no communication but takes fact-
quiz; favors the conclusion. 
6) Basic con - receives no communication but takes the 
same fact-quiz as all other groups; opposes the conclusion. 
In order to control for group differences in general learning 
ability, the six groups thus formed were compared with respect to their 
academic achievements as reflected in the grade-point indexes of the 
Subjects. Separate analyses were made of Subjects taking both the 
immediate and the retention quizzes and for those who took only the 
immediate fact-quiz. An analysis of variance indicated that there was no 
significant difference among the groups with respect to this variable. 
TABLE I.-Comparability of Group Grade-point Indexes, by 
Attitude and Treatment 
Source 
Between 
Within 
Total 
(For all Subjects taking Test #1) 
Sum of Squares d.£. 
.27 5 
32.53 115 
32.80 120 
Mean Square F 5, 115 
.05 
.28 .19 
F required for significance at .OS level 
with d.£. 5, 100: 4.40 
TABLE 2.-Comparability of Group Grade-point Indexes, by 
Attitude and Treatment 
Source 
Between 
Within 
Total 
Sum of Squares d.f. 
.46 5 
7.46 64 
7.42 69 
Mean Square F 5, 115 
.09 
.12 • 7T. 
F required for significance at .05 level 
with d.f. 5, 64: 4.43 
The scores of the 11basic 11 groups were so much lower than those of 
the groups receiving the communication that tests of significance were 
78 
deemed unnecessary. The table below presents the mean scores and standard 
deviations of the basic groups.t. 
TABLE 3.-Scores and 
Standard Deviations of 
Groups Receiving No 
Communication 
Pro 
Con 
n 
21 
4 
Means 
4.17 
5.25 
Findings 
d 
1.68 
2.86 
The first hypothesis predicted a difference between test scores of 
1
unless otherwise noted, the tables refer only to the Subjects who 
had taken both Tests #1 and #2. 
Tables for Differential Effectiveness represent Simple Analyses of 
Variance of scores on Tests #1 and #2 as indicated. Tables for Differential 
Loss ~~present Simol~ Analy~es of Variance of score-points lost between 
Te~=tr ""• J:~nn 'T'PAr :1/lJ T"n-r P::lr.h o--rm1n 
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implicit cons and explicit cons. Tables 4, ~ and 6 are the result of 
analyses of variance for scores on each of the two tests. As in the case 
of the grade-point index analysis, the scores of subjects who took both 
tests were analyzed separately from those who took only the first test. 
TABLE 4.-Differential Effectiveness of Treatments Upon 
Learning py Groups Opposed to the Conclusions: 
(For all Subjects taking Test #1.) 
Source Sum of Squares d. f. Mean Square F 1, 
Between .77 1 '• 77 
Within 692.18 19 36.43 
Total 692.9S 20 
F required for significance at .OS level 
with d.£. 1, 19: 4.38 
19 
.02 
TABLE S.-Differential Effectiveness of Treatments Upon 
Learning by Groups Opposed to the Conclusion: Test #1. 
Source Sum of Squares d.£. Mean Square F 1, 
Between 3.43 1 3.43 
Within 489.50 12 40.79 
Total 492.93 13 
F required for significance at .OS level 
with d.£. 1, 12: 4.75 
12 
.08 
In none of the tables is there any indication of a significant 
difference in fact quiz scores between implicit and explicit cons. The 
! ratios are all well-below that required for significance at the .OS level 
of confidence. The F's on the first test are both smaller than 1. The,! 
on the second test, while greater than l is still not significant. These 
results will be more fully treated in the discussion. 
TABLE 6.-Differential Effectiveness of Treatments Upon 
Learning by Groups Opposed to the Conclusion: Test #2 
Source 
:Between 
Hi thin 
Total 
Sum of Squares d.f. 
36.21 1 
219.50 12 
838.61 13 
Mean Square F 1, 12 
36.21 
18.29 1. 98 
~------~----------------~------~------------~------~ 
F required for significance at .OS level 
with d.f. 1, 12: 4.75 
According to the second hypothesis, the difference between the 
implicit scores and the explicit scores would be larger for the pros than 
for the cons. The results of complex analyses of variance are shown in 
Tables 7 and 8. 
TABLE 7.-Complex Analysis of Variance with Means Adjusted for 
Disproportionality, by Attitude and Treatment: 
(For all Subjects taking Test #1.) 
Sums of Squares 
Source d. f. Mean Square F 1, 92 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
Attitude 1 3.02 1.60 1.60 .04 
Treatment 1 40.69• 39.27 39.27 .91 
Interaction 1 7.75 9.18 9.18 .21 
Wththin 92 3954.17 42.98 
Total 95 
(correction factor:-1.423) 
F required for significance at .OS level with d. f. 1, 75: 3.97 
80 
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None of the F 1 s in Table 7 are significant. Therefore, there is no 
significant difference among the groups in scores on the Urumediate fact-quiz. 
It follows that there are no differences between pro and con groups in the 
differences between scores from implicit and explicit treatments. 
TABLE 8.-Complex Analysis of Variance with Means Adjusted for 
Disproportionality, by Attitude and Treatment: Test #2. 
Sums of Squares 
Source d. f. Mean Square F 1, 53 
Unadjusted Adjusted 
,....---·--
Attitude 1 13.80 13.88 13:..88 .55 
Treatment 1 43.38 43.46 43.46 1.7l 
Interaction 1 106.84 106.76 106.76 4.19 
i-1ithin 53 1349.49 25.46 
Total 56 1513.51 
(correction factor: .083) 
. F required for significance at .05 level with d. f.' 1, 50! 4.03 
In Table 8, there are no significant differences in scores on 
the second fact-quiz when the pro scores are compared with the con scores 
or when the implicit scores are compared with the explicit scores. This 
is indicated by the! values for nAttitude" and for "Treatmentn, each 
of which is below the value required for significance. Hmvever, the 
"Interaction11 factor is significant at the .05 level of confidence. The 
locus of interaction is discovered by performing further analyses of 
variance, comparing scores either by 11attitude11 or by utreatment", that is, 
by comparing implicit cons with explicit cons, impltcit cons with implicit 
pros, etc. In this case, only one of the four possible sources of inter-
action revealed a significant difference . A comparison of the pro implicit 
. ·---·------·--~. __ , -~---- ---·-----
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group with the pro explicit group scores on the second test showed a 
1 difference significant at the .OS level. The scores of the implicit group 
are significantly higher than those of the explicit group. 
Discussion 
Prior to the discussion of the findings, it should be noted that 
the number of Subjects involved in the experiment was much smaller than 
had been intended. The requirements for statistical significance are 
especially stringent with such small N's because of the increased like-
lihood of the operation of chance factors. Therefore, while the reader is 
encouraged to refer to the graph of the results (fig. 1) in order to 
visualize the complex interaction of the experimental variables, he is 
warned to regard the apparent effects with caution, since the N's involved 
are so small. This applies particularly to the con group, which is 
!represented there by the red lines. 
The choice of the .05 level for the criterion of significance is 
arbitrary and bears qualification. Measurements which attain the .05 level 
of confidence are generally regarded as indicative of a trend. They are 
usually not regarded as proof of the hYPothesis or as justification for 
the rejection of the null. hypothesis. None of the findings in this ex-
periment exceed the .05 level. Therefore, the term. "significant difference" 
employed herein is to be understood as suggestive of a trend rather than 
I 
as proof. 
!Hypothesis I 
Analysis of variance of scores of groups opposed to the conclusion 
1
see Table 11, infra, ~ 87 
II 
First Test Second Test 
1~r---------------------------------~----~---------1 
' 
' 
' 
' ' 
' 
' 
' 
'· 
s~---------------------------------------4 
One Week 
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KEY 
Pro Implicit-----
Pro Exp lie it ---
Con Implicit --- -· 
Con Explicit---
Fig. 1.-Graphic Representation of Group Scores on Test #1 and Test #2, jby Attitude and Treatment. 
II 
I 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
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revealed no significant differences on either the first or the second test 
between those receiving the implicit and those receiving the explicit 
1 treatments. The hypothesis is not supported by this finding. TheE 
value for the difference between the treatments ·is larger for the second 
test than for the first, however, and it wa.s deemed worthwhile to in-
vestigate the significance of this difference. An analysis of variance 
was performed on the differences between scores on the two tests, and the 
resulting F ratio fell short of significance. 
TABLE 9.-Differential Loss of Information over Time, 
Between Groups Opposed to the Conclusion, by Treatment 
Source 
Between 
Within 
,Total 
Sum of Squares d.£. 
42. 1 
141.5 12 
183.5 13 
Mean Square F 1, 12 
42. 
11.79 3. 56 
F required for significance at .05 level 
with d.£. 1, 12: 4.75 
Therefore, the loss of retention over time is insignificant and 
cannot be attributed to the difference in treatment of the con groups. 
It will be remembered that the hypothesis included the 
assumption that the attitude involved would be one characterized by a 
high degree of ego-involvement, and that the predicted effect was 
dependent on interference arising from this characteristic. Failure to 
support the hypothesis may be attributed to error in assuming that con 
1
see Tables 4, 5, and 6 supra. p. 
I 
11 
li 
~n 
Subjects were ego-involved in their opposition to birth control. 
that some of them were not so involved was presented earlier. 1 
Evidence 
Another mitigating factor may have been increased attention to the 
challenging message, which might counteract the interference expected as 
a result of ego-involvement. Hovland has noted this possibility: 
But where strong "ego-involving11 issues are concerned his 
independence may be more vigorously asserted, and he may be 
more motivated to examine the arguments and implications 
closely.2 
If this were to have occurred, acquisition of facts as reflected in the 
fact quiz scores might actually have been higher for the explicit than for 
the implicit group. Although the difference between the tlvO groups on 
the second test is not significant, there is a slight if insignificant 
tendency for the retention of the implicit message to decrease relative 
to that of the explicit message. 
If the explicit statement of the conclusion stimulates dis-
cussion, while the implicit statement does not, this might contribute 
further to the better retention of the explicit message. 
Hypothesis II 
The Complex Analysis of Variance on first test showed that there 
had been no significant differences in scores betwee.n· treatments, between 
attitudes, or in interaction between a treatment and an attitude position. 
Scores on the first test reveal no differences Qetween the pro and con 
--·-----------···----------·----------------it 
1 Supra, pp. 62-63, 69-70 
2c. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, Communication and 
Persuasion, Yale University Press (New Haven, 1953) p. 104 
II 
groups in the differential effects of the treatments. 
As was shown in the discussion of the first hypothesis, however, 
the ~ ratios tended to be larger on the second test. Complex Analysis 
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of Variance showed interaction between treatments and attitudes to be 
significant. There are six possible sources of interaction in the present 
case. In the diagram below, they correspond to the two columns, the two 
rows, and the two diagonals. 
FIGURE 2.-Possibilities of Interaction Between Two Variables 
Treatment 
Implicit Explicit 
Pro 
Con 
Thus, implicit pros can be compared with implicit cons or with 
explicit pros; explicit pros can be compared with explicit cons; and 
implicit cons can be compared with explicit cons. The diagonal com-
parisons will not be treated because they do not bear on the hypothesis 
and are of little theoretical value. 
The principal source of the significant F ratio for interaction on 
the second test is the difference between the implicit and explicit pro 
groups. 
The F ratio on the second test (Table 11) is significant, 'tli'hile 
that on the first had been well below significance. The scores of the 
implicit group on the later test, therefore, are significantly better than 
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those of the explicit group. Curiously enough, reference to the graph 
(Figure 1) and comparison of the means of the implicit and explicit groups 
on the first and second tests shows that the differences between the scores 
from the two treatments ar~ almost identical on the two tests. 
TABLE 10.-Differential Effectiveness of Treatments Upon 
Learning by Groups Favoring the Conclusion: Test #1. 
Source Sum of Squares d. f. Mean Square F 1, 41 
r--
Between 107.89 1 107.89 
Within 1909.74 41 46:58 
Total 2017.63 42 
F required for significance at .OS level 
with d.£. 1, 40: 4.08 
2.32 
TABLE 11.-Differentia1 Effectiveness of Treatments Upon 
Learning by Groups Favoring the Conclusion: Test #2. 
Source Sum of Squares d. f. Mean Square F 
t---
Between ll4.01 1 114.01 
Within 1129.99 41 27.56 
Total 1244.00 42 
F required for significance at .05 level 
with d.f. 1, 40: 4.08 
TABLE 12.-Differences Between 
Means of Groups Favoring the 
Conclusion: Tests #1 and #2. 
Test No. 
1 
2 
Difference 
3.17 
3.26 
1, 41 
4.14 
* 
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The reason that the second difference is significant while the first 
is not significant can be found in the difference between the standard 
deviations of the scores. 
TABLE 13.-Standard Deviations 
for Groups Favoring the Con-
clusion: Tests #1 and #2. 
Implicit Explicit 
Test 1 6.77 6.55 
Test 2 5.49 4. 71 
The standard deviations for the first test are sufficiently large 
that the apparent differences between the implicit and explicit means 
could be due to chance. The deviations on the second test are smaller, 
increasing the likelihood that the difference between the means is a 
"real" difference. This is signified by the larger ~ value for the second 
test. 
If the significance of the difference between the scores of 
implicit and explicit pros has increased with time, it would be useful 
to know to what extent this is due to differential decrement in retention. 
The question borders on the academic, since Table 12 shows that the 
difference between the means of the two treatments on the first test is 
only .10 of a score-point less than the difference on the second test. To 
confirm statistically the insignificance of this difference, an analysis 
of variance was performed, utilizing the individual drufferences between 
scores on the first and second tests. 
TABLE 14.-Differential Loss of Information Over T~e, 
Between Groups Favoring the Conclusion, by Treatment. 
Source Sum of Squares d. f. Mean Square F 1, 41 
Between 1.76 1 1.76 
Within 565.31 41 13.79 
Total 565.07 42 
F required for significance at .OS level 
with d.f. 1, 41: 4.08 
.13 
The table shows that the decrement in retention is virtually 
identical for both groups, the ~ value being well below unity. In terms 
of ·lines on the graph (Figure 1), this means that the dotted blue line 
of the implicit pros may be actually parallel to the solid blue line of 
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the explicit pros. However, if the width of each line were drawn to corre-
spend to the variance of the appropriate group, each line would grow 
narrower with time. At the point representing the first test, the lines 
would be so broad as to overlap considerably, indicating that the two 
groups may be from the same population at that point. At the point 
representing the second test, the lines are sufficiently narrow to be 
distinguishable, and the groups they represent are seen to be from 
different populations. 
In short, the increased significance of the difference between 
scores on the second test does not necessarily indicate that the difference 
is larger on the second test than on the first. It can indicate - and in 
this case it does indicate that the variances around the group means 
have grown smaller and the two groups have become more distinguishable. 
I 
I 
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The two treatments, therefore, do have differential effects. Implicit 
treatment is here associated with sign~ficantly higher scores, a result 
which was not expected. Other studies have suggested that explicit state-
ment of conclusions is more effective in producing attitude change when 
resistance is not intense, and it might have been expected that an explicit 
message would have found a more favorable reception among those known to 
favor the conclusion initially. 1 The congruence of the proposal with their 
own attitudes and the explicit manner with which it was presented might 
even have been expected to motivate the Subjects to read it with interest. 
At the same time, the readers of the implicit message might have been ex-
pected to be .less highly motivated to attend to it, since there. was no 
statement of the proposal. 
What appears to have happened is that the implicit pros read the 
message more carefully than the explicit pros. Perhaps the Subjects in 
the latter group interpreted the communication as an attempt to convince 
them of the necessity of birth control. As they were already favorably 
disposed toward the proposal, they may have, in effect, dismissed themselves 
from reading the message. This would account for their relatively low 
scores on the fact-quizzes. 
The implicit pros, on the other hand, having been given no indication 
of the "purpose" of the message, may have interpreted it as a test of 
their learning ability. They had been told that they would be 11 asked 
'some questions" about it, and they apparently assumed that the questions 
1supra, p. 39 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
., . 
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would be concerned with ·the facts in the message rather than with their 
opinions about it. 
The absence of differential effect between the two treatments for 
1 
the con. groups can be explained in much the same way, as was noted earlier. 
Subjects opposed to the conclusion may have been motivated to attend to 
the mess.age more closely when the proposal was explicitly stated. Their 
motivation to attend - being the product of both the desire to answer 
questions and of the urge to meet a challenge to their attitude on the 
topic - was at least equal to the motivation of the Subjects receiving 
the implicit message. Moreover, the slight but insignificant tendency 
for the implicit cons to remember less than the explicit cons with time, 
suggests that the motivation to attend arising from resistance produces 
greater retention than the "short-run" motivation to do well on .a quiz. 
Implicit treatment has been shown to produce higher scores than 
explicit treatment among those favoring the conclusion and to have con-
tributed to the significant interaction effect on the second test. Because 
of the apparently great difference between the scores of the implicit 
pros and the implicit cons, one is prompted to ask whether this difference 
may also have contributed to the significant interaction effect noted in 
Table a·. In the following tables, the first represents an analysis of 
variance of implicit pros and impli~it cons on the first test; the second , 
an analysis of the same variables on the second test. 
1supra~ p. 85 
II 
II 
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TABLE 15.-Differential Effectiveness of Attitude Upon 
Learning by Groups Receiving the Implicit Treatment: 
Test #1 · 
Source Sum of Squares d. f. Mean Square F 1, 26 
Between .01 1 .01 
Within 1198.96 26 46.11 
Total 1198.97 27 
F required for significance at .05 level 
with d.f. 1, 26: 4.22 
.00022 
TABLE 16.-Differential Effectiveness of Attitude Upon 
Learning by Groups Receiving the Implicit Treatment: 
Test 4n 
.. 
Source Sum of Squares d. f. Mean Square F 1, 26 
Between 99.36 1 99.36 
Within 703.32 26 27.05 
Totd 802.68 27 
F required for significance at .05 level 
with d.f. 1, 26: 4.22 
3.67 
The infinitesimally small E value for the difference between the 
pro and con scores after the reading of the implicit message is to be 
expected. The graph (Figure 1) shows that the mean scores were extremely 
close together. In fact, they were less than .05 of a score-point apart. 
A week later, they were separated by 4.59 points. Although the F value 
for this second difference is not significant, it is considerably larger 
than the F for the first test, and appears to indicate a trend. In order 
to test this hypothesis, an analysis was performed on the differences 
within each group from the first test to the second. Table 17 shows the 
results of this analysis. 
TABLE 17.-Differential Loss of Information Over Time, 
Between Groups Receiving the Implicit Treatment, 
by Attitude 
Source Sum of Squares d.f. Mean Square F 1, 26 
Between 
Within 
Total 
75.43 
315.00 
390.43 
1 
26 
27 
75.43 
12.11 
F required for significance at .05 level 
with d.f. 1, 26: 4.22 
6.23 
* 
The ! ratio for the difference between implicit pros-and implicit 
cons in the amount of information lost during one week is the highest 
ratio found in this experiment. It shows that the implicit cons retain 
significantly less information after one week than do the implicit pros, 
even though they had evidenced the same amount of knowledge of the 
content of the communication on the first fact-quiz. 
In this case, motivation to attend appears to have been equal for 
both pro and con groups, since they achieved almost equal scores on the 
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first quiz. It is difficult to account for the difference after one week. 
Since it is not a significant difference, perhaps there is no need to 
account for it. But it would appear to be in order to seek an explanation 
of the significant difference between the differences of the first and 
second weeks. A possible explanation would be interference with retention 
as a result of the implicit cons' discovery that they had been "duped" 
into reading arguments for birth control. Two items on the fact quiz had 
,, 
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been designed to check up on this possibility. There was no indication on 
the part of any of the ~plicit cons that the connection of the message 
with the issue of birth control had been detected. 
Another possible explanation is that the information in the 
message w·as more nearly congruent with infottmlation already included in 
the cognitive structure of the pro Subjects, and was reinforced by his 
social environment, whereas the con Subjects' cognitive structure and 
social environment was implicitly non-congruent with the information 
presented. More specifically, people who favor birth control may be 
more concerned than people who oppose birth control with problems of 
industrial development of underdeveloped countries, even if neither group 
connects the problems with the issue of birth control. But such an 
explanation would be hard to test. There is a need for further ex-
perimentation to-ascertain whether the apparent differential response to 
an ~plicit communication is genuine or simply due to chance. 
Summary 
Hypothesis I 
The first hypothesis - that persons with ego-involved opposition 
to the conclusion in a communication would learn less well the facts 
presented when the conclusion was stated explicitly than when the con-
clusion was ~plicit - was not substantiated. The differences between the 
scores of the group receiving an ~plicit message and the scores of the 
group receiving an explicit message were insignificant. The differences 
on the later quiz, however, while not significant, were larger than on 
the first quiz. It is suggested that there may be an increasing 
II 
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differentiation of the effects of the two treatments with time. Replication 
of the experiment should include retention tests at several wide intervals. 
It was noted that there was a slight, if insignificant tendency 
for the content implicit message to be less well retained than the content 
of the explicit message. If the trend were to continue with time, it 
would constitute a contradiction of the first hypothesis. Consideration 
of this possioility is included in the discussion of findings relative 
to the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis II 
According to the hypothesis, the difference between scores arising 
from the two treatments would be larger among the Subjects opposed to 
the conclusion. There was, however, a difference in scores after the two 
treatments when the Subjects favored the conclusion. The difference 
favored those who had received the implicit communication. 
The absence of difference between the groups opposed to the 
conclusion and subjected to two different treatments, and the unexpected 
superiority of the implicit message in conveying facts to those favoring 
the conclusions were explained on ~he basis of motivation to attend to the 
message. All groups were motivated to some extent because of their 
knowledge that they would be asked some questions afterward. The motivation 
of Subjects opposed to the conclusion may have been heightened by the 
challenge instead of being blocked by it. Perhaps the experimenter had 
overestimated the degree of ego-involvement associated with opposition to 
the issue of birth control. 
Among those favoring the message, the apparently higher motivation 
of the groups reading the implicit message may have been due to a perception 
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of the task which differed from that of the groups reading the explicit 
message. For the former group, it may have appeared to be a test of 
ability to learn new material, while to the latter group it may have 
appeared to be an attempt to create an opinion which they had already 
acquired. The former group would read the message carefully and the latter 
group dismiss it as "nothing new". 
The difference between scores of implicit treatment groups on the 
second test was noted. Although not statistically significant, this 
difference was seen to be far greater than the difference on the first 
test. Analysis showed it to be significantly greater. In other words, the 
implicit p:r;o group lost significantly less information over time than did 
the implicit con group. It was suggested that the sharp drop in retention 
evidenced by the implicit con group may have been due to the absence of 
cognitive support for the material in the Subjects' personal and social 
environment. 
r 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS 
American psychology has been much concerned with the relation of 
attitudes and learning. Attitudes have been recognized as guides of 
behavior and as a key to changing it. The early assumption that attitudes 
could be changed merely by instruction has' been discarded with the reali-
zation that learning itself is a form of behavior which is guided by 
attitudes. Attitudes and learning interact. 
A key factor in this interaction is "perception." Nothing is 
learned which is not first perceived. Bartlett showed that the way a 
person perceives, thinks, and remembers is characteristic of him. Per-
ception is guided by the individual 1 s past experiences, by his purposes 
and attitudes, and by the social and cultural milieu within which he is 
situated. 
Laboratory experiments based on Freudian theory contributed further 
to the understanding of the relation of attitudes and learning. They 
demonstrated the role of emotional factors in the determination of one's 
perception and other cognitive activity. 
Later experiments drew on both the Gestalt theory epitomized in 
Bartlett and on the psychoanalytic theory of Freud. The number of vari-
ables found to be operating in learning situations, especially when opini~ 
ons and attitudes were relevant, increased with the further refinements in 
experimental technique. 
= 
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One such variable was found to be the implicitness or explicitness 
of the statement of conclusion. It was found that when the topic was 
complex and relatively impersonal, the explicit treatment was more effect-
ive in producing attitude change. The question remained as to the effects 
of the two kinds of treatment when the topic was more personal. The 
experiment described herein was concerned with the differences in the 
learning of the content of the communication when the conclusion was 
implicitly and explicitly stated and when the topic was highly personal. 
The topic chosen was birth control, which was felt to be personal 
and ego-involving for a substantial number of people. Students enrolled 
in several college courses were used as subjects for the experiment. First, 
they were given an attitude questionnaire. Two weeks later they read a 
communication whose conclusion was the recommendation of birth control 
to facilitate the economic growth of underdeveloped countries. The 
message read by one group stated this conclusion explicitly, while that 
read by another group did not state the conclusion. Both groups took 
fact-quizzes on the content of the communication immediately after having 
read it, and again one week after having read it. 
According to the first hypothesis, Subjects who had revealed 
opposition to birth control and who read the explicit message would have 
earned lower scores on the fact-quiz than Subjects opposing birth control 
who had read the implicit message. 
According to the second hypothesis, the differences between the 
effectiveness of the implicit-explicit treatments would have been larger 
for those opposed to the conclusion than for those favoring it. 
I 
Neither hypothesis was substantiated. There were no significant 
differences between treatments for those opposed to the conclusion. 
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There was at the tUne of the second test a difference in the effectiveness 
of the treatments for those favoring the conclusion. Thus the difference 
in effectiveness was larger for those favoring the conclusion than for 
those opposing it. Scores of those reading the implicit message were 
significantly higher than of those reading the explicit message. This was 
a direct contradiction of the second hypothesis. 
The effects produced are attributed to differential motivation to 
attend the message. All Subjects may have been motivated by the knowledge 
that they would be tested. Subjects who opposed the conclusion may have 
been motivated to investigate it more closely. If this was the case, it 
suggests that the ego-involvement which had been expected to cause inter-
ference with perception had been weaker than the desire to meet the 
challenge of a message with which the reader disagreed, Subjects who read 
the implicit message and were known to be opposed to birth control may 
have been motivated by the desire to do well on the test. 
Among those favoring the conclusion, the readers of the explicit 
message may have perceived it as an attempt to "selln them on birth control. 
Since they were already favorably disposed to it, they may have excused 
themselves from reading it carefully. On the other hand, Subjects favorable 
to the conclusion and exposed to the implicit message would appear to have 
thought the intent of the message to be 11instruction of facts 11 and to have 
read it accordingly--much as had those who were opposed to birth control 
and received the "implicit11 treatment. 
= · .. 
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If motivation to attend were the only operating factor, however, it 
would be expected that learning and retention of the implicit message would 
be the same for groups both favorable and unfavorable to the "hidden" 
conclusion. But it was noted that the groups opposing the conclusion for-
got significantly more of the implicit message than had the group favoring 
the conclusion, despite the fact that their initial fact-quiz scores had 
been extremely close to each other. As the readers of the implicit 
message had not indicated recognition of the implicit conclusion on 
either fact-quiz, the differential loss is not attributable to retroactive 
inhibition. It is suggested, therefore, that Subjects opposed to the 
conclusion may lack the particular frame of reference into which the infor-
. 
mation might easily be absorbed. The absence of this frame may be 
significantly correlated with opposition to the unstated conclusion. 
There is nothing in the data which could be used to test this suggestion, 
but it is offered as an interesting hypothesis for further research. 
The lack of significant differences where they were expected, and 
their presence where unexpected may be due to the suggestions offered above. 
But other factors, 1 _almost certainly contributed to the failure to support 
the hypothesis. 
1. Three groups of Roman Catholic students at a parochial college 
were withdrawn from participation shortly after the experiment began. 
These groups probably would have evidenced stronger opposition to 
birth control than the ·other Catholic Subjects, because of 
1 Supra, pp. 69-72. 
self-selective factors and because of the social reinforcement of 
Catholic norms at the parochial college. 
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Therefore, the expected ego-involvement was lower among the 
Subjects tested. These Subjects were students in a non-sectarian 
college. Besides being initially less vehement in their opposition 
to birth control, they were subject to numerous cross-pressures in 
this relatively more heterogeneous environment. 
2. Attendance was low and irregular at classes in which the 
experUnent was conducted. The number of Subjects undergoing all 
of the several stages of the experUnent was lower than had been 
expected. This rendered less likely the finding of statistically 
significant results, 
3. There were indications of hostility in the classes in which the 
experiment was conducted. Some of this hostility was not connected 
with the experimental stimuli and may have distorted the Subjects 1 
responses. 
Another contributing factor may have been the coarseness of the 
instrument used to measure attitude. Aside from the invalidity of the 
scale values found by Thurstone in 1930, the assumptions upon which the 
construction of the attitude scale is based are questionable. Ideally an 
attitude scale will indicate with some degree of certainty the way one will 
behave when confronted with a certain stimulus. It assumes that the 
stimulus to which the scale has reference is the "same" stimulus in most 
cases, and that the resulting behavior is therefore predictable. But the 
scale cannot distinguish between the stimulus as it appears in one context 
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and the "same" stimulus when it appears in another context. In the present 
instance, for example, one may respond to the scale as if speaking only of 
his attitude toward his own practice (or non-practice) of birth control. 
But the message which the Subjects read was concerned with "other people's" 
practice of birth control under different circumstances. For these Subjects 
the topic of the message may have been impersonal and their attitudes 
quite different from attitudes toward a message urging them to practice 
birth control themselves. Thus, learning would be no different for the 
Subjects receiving the implicit message than for those receiving the 
explicit message. 
It is necessary, therefore, when speaking of "an attitude," to 
recognize that the attitude may manifest itself in various ways--even in 
seemingly contradictory ways--from one situation to another. The concept 
of attitudes as a relatively enduring set of respons'es to specific stimuli 
must be regarded with some suspicion, lest they be considered as fixed 
entities with deterministic properties. It is safer to think of attitude 
as a hypothetical construct which enables us to state probabilities as to 
the kind of responses to be expected from a particular individual when 
confronted with stimuli in a field. The relation between attitude and 
learning, then, is a function also of elements in the field other than the 
attitude or stimulus themselves. Prediction of learning behavior and/or 
attitude change must not exclude consideration of the other operating 
forces. 
APPENDIX A 
A TTI'!UD~S TOWAHl> BIR'J.ti cor;TJWL 
This is a stl\dy of' attitudes toward birth controlo It consists 
of' twenty statements expressing dif'ferent attitudes toward birth controlo 
Put a check mar.lC (v} 1:f you agree with the st~te"'tent. 
Put a double check (V'v) if' you strongly agree with the statemento 
Put a cross (X} if you disaeree with tne statemento 
I:f you cannot decide about a state"!lent you may mark it with a 
question mark. 
This is not nn examination. People differ in their op1u1ons 
about what is right and wrong in this issue. 
Please indicato tour own attitude by a cneok mark wnen you a~ree, 
by double check when you agree emphatically, and by a cross when you 
dist:leree. 
Nanie 
..... 
* * * 
'J'HE J4,JLL:>WING IH' Oi;7!A TION WI~L R·. KEPT IN S'J'RICTt.ST COr~l· IV NC:E 
A!IID WIT,L BTi. USED ~OR A 'T'TITI"TDE RESEARCH O.NLY 
~ ) t ,J 1 '! 
------------------------------·------ Age _______ sex ___ _ 
-. ; 
Rel1~~~1ous ~~,f,i~1~it1on _____________ ---- ":Ta~i ta 1 stat us 
---
Collec;e · '· ' ~· ----------------------------- C"'lass Yenr -----
PWl' A S ING.LJ!.: ,-~:n:~r.F: ( v) IF YOU A TIER 
PiTT A :.I'OUBLr:. CllliCK (v v) IF YOU AGRI.'R ~TRONGLY 
PUT A CROSS ()() IF YOU ; 1ISAGi~F.E 
1. __ Birth control is a legitimate health measure 
2._ Birth control isnecessary for women who must help earn a living. 
3. __ ~e practice of birth control may be injurious physically mentally, 
or morally .. 
4. __ We simply m':st have birth control. 
5. __ The practice of birth control isequivalent to murder. 
6. __ Bi~th control has both advantages and aisadvantages. 
7. __ Only a fool can oppose birth control. 
a. __ Birth control increases tne happiness of marriea life. 
9. __ Decency forbids the use of birth control. 
10. __ B1rtn control should be absolutely prohibited. 
11. __ Birtn control is tne only solution to many of our social problems. 
12. __ Birth control reduces the marital relation to tne level of vice. 
13._ Birth control has nothing to ao with morality. 
14. __ Birth control information should be available to everyhody. 
15. __ .Birtn control is morally wrong 1n spite of its possible benefits. 
16. Uncontrolled reproduction lends to overpopulRtion, social unrest, 
- rmd war. 
17. Birth control is race suicide. 
-
18. __ People should be free to do whatever they wisn about birth control. 
19. __ The practice of birth control evades man's duty to propagate the race. 
~u ._ Tne slignt benefits of birth control hardly .1ust1fy it. 
APPE1lJ>IX B 
INDUST .1aAL lJl!."V.t:;lDPlL::NT 
~e Wlderdewloped ~t:l.ons or the world aro determined to enjqy a 
standard or living COtlp8.1"able to that o£ the liestern nationso ~hey re~~ 
with env:,r and admiration ~e heavi]¥ industrialized areas which not on:J.y 
possess an abwvlant food saapp]¥ g but also produce "ore~ture comforts"" 
No countf'7 has made substantia1 pro~ss until about hal£ or the 
worldng population has bee~ shifte~ £rom agriculture to industeyo Indus ... 
trial development is needQ~ to provide the zaecessary construction, trans ... 
portation9 c~cationp housing, clothing and a more efficient agricu1 ... 
. J • 
ture o Strange as it JDa7 seemp the higher proportion or peopla ·Jngaged in 
agriculttaz-e, the poorer is the diet or the population~ 
The people of Asia, with three f'ourths of the population engaged 
in :food production, 11ave insufficient food.o By contrast, in the United 
States, lest. than a seventh or our ~bor force is direct~ engaged in 
fanning 9 and Yi th ample land they produce more food than we DB~do 
Agrioul ture is based :targe;q on :renewable 1'88'"~urces much can be 
replaced every yearo Dut industq is dependent largely upon nonre11enable 
resourceso lbese resour~s are capital resources and are not r~plenished 
each yearo Arc the capital resources o£ coal, oU, and essen"'t:ialmcta1..s 
sufficient to provide an future needs or even the imltediate u~!eds or a 
higb]3 industrialized 11orl.d? 
Mineral Resources 
The reserves of our capital resources are, of course, n~kl(nm, 
but the estimates are not encouragingo The British Political and Economic 
:r:s:mning Committee estimates that at the 19~ rate of 1wrld consumption,. 
-.,-.~.,.-t'"!'•'.'-~~ 
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c probable reserves o:t' iron ore irould last 200 yearso The estimated re .. 
s rves or coppor would last ao years; tin, 35 years; and lead11 o~ 25 yearso 
lio L.. I<:eenl_ysir.~, speald.ng beforo the United No. tious Scientific Con- · 
in 1949, expresEed the situation as foUowsc "It is c~ that there 
no immediate over-::.U shortage o£ an.v essential mineralso nut it is 
ually clear that unless there is a fundamental change in the economic 
f hric of human soci~ty" t;e vi.U ultinate~ be faced 11ith the exhaustion · 
o many of our mine1al resourccsb In some cases, particulal"~ lead, copper 
d cobalt, and poEsib~ iron and coal, the supp~ will be exhausted lllOI'e 
pidly than in o-tters.~ Nev discoveries, improved methods of extraction 
processing, n•.1 ce.reful conservation wi.U postpon~ the advent of criti .. 
1 shorth ;es~ S·tbstitution may provide alternate solution8 but this is 
hope, not a prt·.:dso .. " 
The reserres of energy resourcese even without atomic energ:y, are 
..:quate for ~·' ner::· future. The coal reserves aDa¥ last one thousand to 
e!ieral thousantl yen·s, depcndin!t on the estimated rai;e of aonsumptiono 
e oilreservmJ, i~1luding ~hale deposits, at 1950 rates of consumption 
uld last several ·~ ,ndred yearsSJ but the deMnd tor oil is increasing far 
ore rapid~ than tt:.t tor coal. It seet:~S certain t~t the world's annual 
roduction of oil t·i':iLl have fallen tar behind the demands of its growing 
Although the :oal supplies are more than adequate for the next cen-
coa1 rJJa'3 be D: lded for the pr~~t;tion of oil before the end of this 
ntury~ By that "e::Jes atomic enerw IJ!J1Iq meet a considerable part of our 
ncrgy needsq Stil:, it does not seem likely f.Aat atomic enez;gy can be 
trucks0 and tractors so essential. :f'or efficient agri-
lfu.en all of the co<amtriea of tho trorld. become industrialized, the 
pita1 reserves o£ critical minerals, oil, and coalldll. be tar from ade-
q teo If the per capita consnnption of the present world population 
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e ualled that of the lfestern nations, cons·nnption 'lfould increase about tive-
ldo To ~11!1 the standard o£ living in 1.w United States, more than a 
enfold increase would be needed. It is olntlous that the 'entire world 
annot be high~: industrialized before the 21\t centt.o.y, and then onl;r if 
e new frontiers at science are greatly expar.ied. 
ltarrison Brown, in his book The Challenre of l.tan's FUture pre,;icts 
at 'lri.th abundant atomic energy it t'1ould event ally be possible to ~tain 
e basic rav materi!lls for industX7 from the aio., f~ the OC@la.ns, and 
rom ordi.Dary rock... '1'he air would provide o~ger. and nitrogen; the oceans 
ou1d produce ~ogen and magnesium and other e:h ~nts; and too rocks 
uld yield not. onl3 most of the essential metals fl r~t also the thoriUIII 
ura.niwn needed for atomic energy for many thous•nds olr' even millions . 
uclear Power No Solution Nov 
The importance to mankind of nuclear power liee not in the present, 
nor in the near futqre, but in tne distant future~ EVlrtual~, atomic 
pol:er ~ provide for most of' our energy needs, but it b unlike~ that 
it l(i11 do so during thia cent~~ 
Abqut 20 percent of the world's people are enjoy!.~ the Golden A:~ 
or }!an .. and another 20 percent are making rapid pro~eGs~ But many indus ... 
trialized countries are rapidly ·tsing up their cmn resources as well as 
those of their undGrdeveloped neighbors. The Uestern nations ~deplete 
the oil reserves of co ~ntries in the .i:iid.dle East and Latin America before 
these countries can use the oil themselves. 
i~ of' t~e unde~w1oped ®Untries have on]3 l.:imi ted supplies of 
coal and oilo 1Iost of the world's coal is in N"rth America and Asian 
U.S.S.R. Iron ®re is often fez f'ron the source of coal, and the costs of 
transporting coal great distances .are hip,ha Even if' atomic enerfW' is soon 
available at mod.erate cost, it uil.l require several decades to train people 
to bui1d, equip, and operate ·the industrial plants, the transportation 
systeme and the otbar facilities of a. modern industrial state .. 
Food and l~power Resour~es 
Many of' the underdeveloped cotmtries ~d especially those of Asia • 
. ,·. 
must double their food supp~ with the little more land that can be brought 
into cultivation«? Industrialization wiU not penuit substantial imports 
~ } 
of' food into countries wi- large 1»1>ulations. In these areas industrial-
ization can, bowever, prom.ote a more efficient agriculttn-e• releasing man-
powr for industry, education, research, public health, and other services .. 
Foreign Aid Onl,y a Partial Solution 
107 
It is of'ten assumed that money is all that would be needed to indus-
trialize the uorld.. In 1951, a commission of the United Nations experts 
estir.la.ted tbat a program for the deve1opment of agriculture and industry-
would cost about $19 billion a year,. This would total almost $1,000 billion 
in 50 yearso Contributions by the industrial countries would have to cOver 
at least half the cost9 particularl;y' in the ear]¥ stages o£ developmen.to 
If auoh a program prevented a third world ar9 it would be 1f0t"1.11 
the priceo Stringfellow Barr, author, historian and former professor at 
po:J.it:i.cal science, has estimated that \iorld liar II coat the United States 
alone more than $300 billion and the cost to the entire World was about 
$29000 billiono The present "cold war'' will cost the world more than 
$2,000 if' lon~ continued, and a nuclear "hot 11ar" could 1n-eclt modem 
civilizationo 
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APPEND!f C 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPUENT 
1he 1m~eveloped nations o£ the uorld are determined to en3oy 
a standard ot living COI!lp<"lft.ble to that of the llestern Jltionso Yet, 
having already talcen advantage o£ llestern pror,ress in medicine and pub= 
lie health measures, they find their populations growiDg hater than their 
economieso Death rates are det.tlini11g without an equal decline in birth 
rateso 
The tolloving discussion will shoW that the greatest obstacle to 
.better livilig conditions is not the lack or money, tools, 'tecbnol.og.y, or 
trained personnel, but the pressure o£ rapid population growth on 1imi ted 
resourceso Unless these nations soon adopt contraception as an effective 
means of population control., their standards o£ living vi11 decline instead 
o£ riaingo 
No 001m:try has made substantial ·progress until about half' ot the 
working population has been shifted from agriculture to industry9 Industrial 
d.evelopmu~t is needed to provide the neces8817' construction, tranaportationp 
communication9 housing 9 clothing and a more efficient agriculture~ Strange 
as it lf1a'3 seem8 the higher proportion ot people engaged in agriculture9 the 
poorer is the diet or tbe populationo 
The people of Asia9 with three fourths or the population engaged in 
food production, have insuf'f'icient toodo Dy contrast, in the United States 
less than a seventh of our labor force is direct~ engaged in farming 9 and 
with ample land they produce JD01""8 t"ood than n needo 
4grioul.ture is based largela' on renewable resources vhioh can ~ 
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replaced every 1'!&ro .Uut ind'-'stry is dependent largel;y upon nonrenewabls 
resources. These resources are capital resources and are not replenished 
each yearo Are the ~pi tal resources o£ coal, oi19 an~ essential mntala 
sufficient to provide all future needs or even the imm:edia te needs of a 
highl¥ industrialized world? 
lfineral Resources 
The ;reserves or our capital resources are, or course, not Icnown, but 
the esthates at'S not encouraging. The British Political and iconomic 
Ph.nning c.c.d.ttee (PEP) estimates ·that at the i9SO rate of world consump-
tion, the probab~, reserves of iron ore would last ~oo years.. The estima-
ted ~serves of copper would last 80 years.;· tin, ss years; and 1131ad, ~ 25 
years. 
II. L11 ~en~side, speaking before the United Nations Scienti£io Con-
gress in 1949;, ~re.ssed the situation as. follows: ~It is clear that there 
is no i,.ma:l.ediate over-aU shortage of any essential miner~ls~ nut it is 
equa~ clear tbat the demand for minera1 products is ~creasing at such 
a rate that unless there is a fundamen~ cl;lange i~ the economic fabric ot 
human ~;ociet,:,. we will u1 timate~ be f'ace4 Vi th the expaustion of man.v of 
our mineral resources. In SOJ!Ml cases, parti~l;r ~ad, copper and cobalt, 
and possibl\v' iro11 and oil, the supply. will be ~usted more rapidly than 
in otJ;ters. New discoveries, impToved methods of extraction a~ processing, 
and careful conservation will postpone the advent of .cri ti91ll ~bol,"tages" 
Substitution 'f1!AJ' provide alternate· ao1utions, bl{t tlrl.s is ~ :h~, not a 
promise o" J 
j 
The "fundamental change in the econ9mic fabric J'IUSt certafnlT involve 
limitation or population if the consumption oi' nonreneua.ble resources is 
to be kept under control • 
.Eneriq Resources 
The reserve$ of energy resources, even witl~out atc7Bd.c cnerg, a.~.-e 
adequate fo~ the ncar futureo The coal reserves fftilY last one thoueil8.nd to 
seven.l thousand years, dep~ding on the estimated rate of c~~nsumptiono 
The oi1 reservest imtluding shale deposits, at 1950 rates of consumption 
would last several. hundred yea!.~, but the demand for oil is increasin~ far 
more rapi~ than for coal<> It seems certain that the world's annual pro-
duction o£ oil will have fallen far behind demand by 1965. 
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Although the coal supplies are more than adequate £or the next cen-
tury, coal ~ be needed for tho production of oil before the end of this 
century o sly that time, atomic energy JDZcy" met a considerable part of our 
energy needs. Still, it does not seem like~ that atomic energy can be 
used in automobiles, atrucks, and tractors so essential for efficient agri .. 
culture. 
lihen aU of the countries of the world become industrialized, the 
capital reserves ot critical oi.nerals, oil, and coal 1dU be far f'ram ade-
quateo Etren if the per capita consumption of the f{fe&ent world population 
equalled that of the Uestern nations, constUDPtion would increase ahout 
five:fold" To equal the standard o:f living in the United States, more than 
a ten:fold incre·3se would be needed. It is obvious that the entire world 
cannot be highly industrialized before the 21st century and then only it 
population growth is controlled and the new fr01ttiera of science are great-
ly expanded. 
Harrison Brown. in his book Tbe Ctallen.ge of Han •s Jtuture predicts 
that with abundant atomic energ it would eventually be possible to obtain 
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the basic nLl'T ma"tt--.:t'it~-ls for i.D.dustr:f from the air, from the o~s and from 
ordi.tiEU7 rocko The air wOuld provide oxygen and riitrogenf the oceans 1f0Uld 
produce hydrogen and aagnesiuti and other QlQ~Ats; tt.nd th.e rocks wo t4d y~eld 
not onl;r ~st o£ the es®ential metals, but al.s() the thorium. and uranium 
needed for atomic energy for many thousand& or e~n millions o£ yeana,~ 
Nuclsar Pouer No Solution Now 
The impQr~c.e .:00 man'l:tind o£ ·nuclear powr lies not in the p~sent 
~ . . ~ 
nor in the near fu~, but in the dis~t future. Eventually, atond.c 
. ., . . " ... ;. 
power ml1 prO.Vide for most of our enet:'gy :118~&, but it is ~~ that 
. . . ~. ' . . .. . . •· . . . 
it will do so dur~g ttu,.s c:entury. 
Ab~~ 20 percent of ti~e world's people are enjoy~ the G~ld~~ Age 
of Man. and ~th.- 20 percent are malting. ~pid pr.~ss~ But~ JAdus-
triaiized ~ot.m~ies are ~J.?i.~ using up #l~:i:r. ~ ~s~cu, as ual1 as those 
of their 'U11de%"4eveloped neighborsa 'J.'he Uest~r.n nations ~ deplete the oil 
reserves of count.r:les i.J:1 tl).e l.fiddle East and latin Amarica before ~Ji.e coun-
tries can use th:e oil themselves~ The p~gress o£ these countries to a star,& 
where they can male use of their own res~~s is being retarded 1zy' their 
rapid populntion growth. 
l·fany of tho underdeveloped countries ha'-e only limited supplies or 
coal and oil. Most of the world's coal is in North America and Asian u .. s.s~R. 
Iron ore is often far from the source of coal, and the costs o£ transporting 
coal great distances are high~ h'ven if atomic energy is soon availa})le at 
moder~te cost• it will reql$-e several de.cades to train people to buAd~ 
equip, and operate the industrial plants, ~~ Ve.nsportaticm system ~d the 
other r-.cilities of a modem industrial state., · 
All of this takas time, but populations continue to grow faster than 
the nations progresso 
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Neither Impcrts nor Emiey;a tan a Solution 
llany ot the underdeveloped countries, and especial:cy' those of Asia, 
"lUSt double their food suppl;y with the little more land thflt c~.n b·~ brought 
u 
into cultivation4 In~trialization will not perMit substantial imports of 
food into cotmtries l'ri.th lar·~e populations.. Mass emigration is no lonp,er 
a practical solution to loverpopul.ation. In these areas industrialization 
can, however, pormote a more efficient agriculture, releasing manpower ('or 
industry, educa~iOl,l, research, pui.>lic health1 and other services. 
"Forei0n Ald'' onl{ a fartial Solution 
It is often assumed that mone7 is all that .,ould be needed to indu8-! 
trial.ize thu uorlq. ~ 1051 a commission of the United Nations expert$ 
estimated that a p~gram for the developm,ent of a:gricult~e and ind,.tqr 
would cost abput $19 billion a year.. .uut · according to the PEP, these experts 
underestimated th~ rapid increase iJ1 the recent rate of population growth 
and probabl;y ~oss:cy un<terestit!J&ted future rates or increase~ Eve~ $20 
billion a year, however, would total $1,000 billion in 50 y~s. Con'rihu-
tions by the industrial oountr~ea would ~ve to ccwer at lerst hal£ the 
cost, particular~ in the ear~ stages of develo~t. 
I:£ such a program prevented a t:lird world war, it would be north the 
priceo Stringfellow .tmrr, autbr, l~istorian and former professor of poli-
tica1 science has es~ted that llorld liar II .cost tho United S~tos a1one 
more than $300 billion and the cost to the entire world was about $2,QOo 
billiono The present ''cold war" w:i.U cost the wor.l_d oore ~ $2,000 
billion if long continue~ and a nuclear "hot war" co ;lei 1d'eck modern civi• . 
lizationo 
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Financial aid and good intentions9 however, are not enougho As 
PEP points our, such measures ignore the f'undamental'Jpoint that unless 
reproduction is controlled, population 1f:l.U rise at the expense of living 
standards. 
The Problem and the Solution 
The ba!\ic problem is the race between industrialization and the 
accelerated population . gr01rth produced bT morta1i v controlo The majCil" 
need o£ the underdeveloped countries thus becomes that o£ devising ways 
by 1'lhich the rate ot increase or the rural population can be controlled 
lllOl'8 rapidly than it would be if relianoe were placed solel¥ on the sl.ow 
process of cu1tural diffusion :£rom. the cities to the countryside. 
Birth control usual.l3 follows industrial. developmento But it can 
be seen that this happens too s~ to solve the problem o:£ excessive 
population pressure in most o:£ the worldo Unless birth rates are reduced aa 
rapid~ aa the dec1ine o:£ death rates, the increased products o:£ agricul-
ture and industry wiU almost certai~ be gobbled up by the stork. 
The conclusion to which one nnast be drawn is that contraception 
must be adopted b;r the mtire population- and soon. 
APPENDIX D 
Sectionooooo oooo o o 
1. s~ the ...l idaa(a) of the article on "Induatrial ~· in one 
4o 
ar two aentenoea · 
f. 
umption of the entire world ware to equal that of the 
ion of the world's reaouroes would l!lUltip~ by a 
the les a / 
~:S=oviU not replace gasoli~ engines in can, trac 
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cd.1 produotiOD expected to tall behiDd the world's needs? , "o .. o . • 
9 o In..._.. to~ substantial progress, what proportion of the working popula• 
tion -'ust ahitt troa agriculture to indwt17l 
10., 
u .. 
12. 
Coal reserves are expected to laat o •••••••• o o. • • • year~ o 
llost ot the world'• oaal is locat.d in two aro&al ooo.u.p .. oooeoeooou• Nld 
• •......• o ... o o.... • A major problea uaooiatect vi th this fact is: 
lhat propcntion ot ~cans ia engaged in agriculture? 
The estimated coat or a world development program is o.o eoouo•••eo ... o per yallr q 
llov much of this would ccma f'rOIIl iad1atrial countries? • • • .. • • • • • • .. u 
24. The iron ore reserwa, at the 1950 rate ot coaaUBption11 are expected to last 
l&o Coal conSUIIIptiOD can be expected to (riM) (taU) in the n~ar t'utureo lfl\y? 
18. 'lhe primary obstacle to industrial and eoon&c dewlaplent ia x 
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